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 I 
Abstract 
China has experienced a persistent shortage of electricity generating capacity since the late 1960s. 
This capacity shortage is mainly due to the shortage of thermal generating capacity. However, the 
shortage of thermal generating capacity has not been stable. There were several ups and downs in 
the shortage of thermal capacity while functioning capacity always fell behind desired capacity. 
System dynamics modeling was used to study the problem and endogenous causes for the 
oscillatory capacity shortage were analyzed. It was found that failure to take into account the 
capacity under construction can explain the oscillations in the shortage of capacity, while 
capacity shortage can be attributed to ignorance of construction time when deciding construction 
start so that capacity under construction was not big enough to increase functioning capacity in 
the presence of 3 years’ construction time. Underestimates of desired capacity and underestimates 
of capacity depreciation were also part of the reasons for capacity shortage. The policy option of 
managing the stock of capacity under construction was recommended to both eliminate the 
oscillations in the capacity shortage and reduce the shortage. It was found that the policy was 
robust subject to long construction time. It was suggested in the paper that National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) update their estimates of GDP growth rate, electricity intensity 
growth rate and capacity depreciation on a quarterly basis so as to reduce capacity shortage. 
However, capacity shortage becomes larger as GDP grows faster. Introducing more market effect 
into electricity price so that electricity price could be higher in the presence of electricity shortage 
could be an effective solution to improve electricity efficiency, thus offsetting fast growth in GDP 
a bit and  thus reducing the capacity shortage, if the price elasticity in China is big enough.  
 
Key words:  electricity industry, electricity generating capacity; thermal capacity, electricity 
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 1 
1 Introduction  
Since the late 1960s, China has experienced large-scale shortage of electricity. There was a 
consensus that the shortage of electricity in the 1960s and 1970s was due to the intensive 
economy at that time. Intensive economy was known as high input, high consumption and low 
efficiency. Growth in economy was purely owed to increasing resource, i.e. more labor and more 
capital, rather than improvement in technology or productivity. Many high electricity-
consumption industries generated a very high electricity demand, while the construction of 
electricity generating capacity lagged far behind. In 1978, China went through a reform and 
began to open up to the whole world. After that until 1997 when Asian Financial Crisis broke out, 
China had witnessed an unprecedented economic growth rate (GDP grew at a growth rate of 9% 
every year on average from 1978 to 2003, while growth rate from 1953 to 1978 was 4.8% (Gui 
and Huo 2006)), which led to an even higher electricity demand.  
However, investment in electricity generating capacity was stagnant. The government was 
the only one to invest, distribute and sell electricity until 1985. Electricity price was set just to 
compensate capacity depreciation and cost to produce unit electricity, taking no account of 
revenue and reproduction on an extended scale (Wang 2006). In 1985 Chinese government came 
out with provisional regulation on encouraging fund-collecting to build electricity power plant 
and multi electricity price. It allowed more types of investors, including Chinese-Foreign Equity 
Joint Ventures, Stock Companies, Local Government and enterprises, which introduced more 
ways of financing for the construction of generating capacity. At the same time, it allowed 
different electricity prices at different stages of a power plant. There were 3 stages: startup, time 
to pay back the loan (10 years usually), and time after loan is paid (Wang 2006). Electricity 
generating companies sell the electricity at a highest price at the startup stage, because generators 
usually tend not to work stably so the cost at this stage is the highest. During the years to pay 
loan, although the investors have to pay the loan for each unit of electricity produced, things 
begin to run smoothly so the cost of unit electricity is largely reduced. Therefore, at this stage, 
they are allowed to sell electricity at a relatively higher price but not as high as the startup stage. 
Once the load is paid back, electricity price will be adjusted lower. Some observers believed that 
this regulation worked well to motivate investment in electricity capacity construction. As shown 
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in Figure 1, the annual growth rate of total installed capacity was about 5% from 1980 to 1985 
and about 10% after 1985. Due to the increase in the total installed capacity, the shortage of 
electricity was much alleviated since the beginning of the 1990s. However, it didn’t turn the 
situation of electricity shortage around.  
Growth Rate of Total Installed Capacity in the 1980s and
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Figure 1 Growth Rate of Total Installed Capacity from 1980 to 1993 
 
Source:  State Power Information Network 
China Electric Power Information Center 
Hydro and thermal power composition in both installed capacity and electricity generation from 
1952 to 2001 
                      http://www.sp.com.cn/zgdl/dltj/d0104.htm  
 
In the late 1990s, slower growth in electricity demand temporarily closed the shortage gap as 
the Asian Financial Crisis aggravated the economic growth in China (DRCNET 2005). See the 
growth rate of GDP, electricity consumption and electricity generating capacity in Figure 2. The 
three curves almost kept in phase all the time. Starting from 1994 the GDP growth rate in China 
was on the cycle of decrease, but the growth rate went down to even less than 10% from 1997 to 
2000. The growth rate of electricity consumption was also on the downward tendency and even 
lower than GDP growth rate from 1995 to 1999. So it was with electricity generating capacity, 
which was even higher than the growth rate of electricity consumption. The moderate growth rate 
in electricity demand gave time for electricity capacity construction to catch up. The power plants 
that had been started several years ago were finished during these years. Years from 1996 to 1999 
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witnessed an annual growth rate of electricity capacity at 8.5%, while the electricity consumption 
grew correspondingly at a growth rate of 5% on average.  
Growth Rate of GDP, Electricity Consumption and Electricity
Generating Capacity from 1976 to 2002
-5
0
5
10
15
20
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Time (Year)
Gr
ow
th
 R
at
e 
(%
)
GDP
Consumption
Capacity
 
Figure 2 Growth Rate of GDP, Electricity Consumption and Electricity Generating Capacity from 1976 to 
2002 
 
Source:  National Bureau of Statistics of China (2007)             
Gross Domestic Product 
              http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2007/indexch.htm  
              Global Econ Data 
China, GDP deflator, 1980~2006 
              http://www.econstats.com/weo/C035V021.htm  
(He, Zhao et al. 2006) 
The Study of the Relationship between Power Industry and National Economy Growth in China 
 
A short-term electricity surplus may have existed, but it was short-lived and an explanation 
will be discussed in Section 3. Five years later in 2002, the problem of electricity shortage 
appeared again and even aggravated. On one hand, alleviation of electricity shortage gave an 
impression that there was enough electricity to use. As a consequence, heavy industry, steel 
producing and machinery, developed rapidly from 2000. The heavy industries were electricity-
intensive, which underlined a huge amount of electricity demand in the future. On the other hand, 
this alleviation put the decision makers of electricity capacity construction, the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), in an over-optimistic mood, which became less 
motivated to construct new power plants (DRCNET 2005). In 1998, only 10.47 Gigawatt of 
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capacity was constructed, while more than 20 Gigawatt were constructed on average before 1997. 
In 1999 and 2000, less than 6 Gigawatt was started construction each year (Yi 2006). 
The NDRC is a department of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, which 
was originally founded in 1952 named as State Planning Commission. Then in 1998 it was 
renamed as State Development Planning Commission. In 2003, it incorporated some functions of 
former Economy Policy Reform Office of the State Council and the State Economic and Trade 
Commission, and became what it is now. It is a macro-control department responsible for 
important economic and social development policies, overall balance and guiding the overall 
reform of the economic system.  
As for electricity industry, its mission is: to study the strategic objectives and deployment of 
power system development (including development and power grid Development); to study how 
power system interacts with other departments in the national economy, etc. Power system 
planning in general can be divided into short-term, medium-term and long-term planning. Short-
term planning is generally about five years. It aims to as accurately as possible foresee the 
demand of both electricity capacity and electricity generation and to balance the capacity and 
electricity generation every year. It is responsible for the construction of electricity capacity and 
annual investment of capacity.  
As shown in Figure 2, GDP growth rate increased again after 2000. In 2002, China 
experienced another severe electricity shortage, which reached its summit in 2004. According to 
the rough estimate made by dispatching department of grid companies, in 2002, there were 12 
provinces in China suffering from this electricity shortage. Gap in generating capacity was 20.35 
Gigawatt on average. It turned to 24 provinces and 30 Gigawatt in 2003. In 2004, the whole 
China was suffering from severe lack of electricity, and the gap in generating capacity reached 35 
Gigawatt. In 2005, things got better, the gap in generating capacity 25 Gigawatt (DRCNET 2005). 
The persistent gap between electricity demand and supply was evident again. 
The shortage of electricity caused problems to economy. Industries had to shut down their 
machines in those days of limited electricity, which caused a huge economic loss to investors and 
local government. As a whole, GDP in China was also largely harmed due to electricity shortage. 
Take Zhejinag province, one of the most developed economies in China for example. In 2004, 
Zhejiang Province was short of electricity by more than 75 Terawatt hours, which caused an 
economic loss of more than 100 billion CNY (Li 2004). In the perspective of people’s lives, 
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people had to restrain themselves from many night activities. Even during daylight hours, they 
could not full utilize their home appliances. Students above preliminary school had to light up 
candles in order to read and study. The whole of China really suffered.   
The paper first examines the characteristic problematic behavior of China’s electricity 
industry. Then a system dynamics model is developed and used to discover the structure which 
might be responsible for the problematic behavior. Some policy options were also developed.  
2 Literature review  
There has been much research addressing the electricity problems in China. Some 
researchers argued over the characterization of the problem, whether it was electricity shortage, 
or electricity surplus, or cycles of alternating electricity shortage and surplus. Among these 
researchers, some also gave their hypotheses about the causes for whatever problem they 
addressed. However, they either agreed on a cause which I have different views on, or there was 
disagreement among themselves about their hypotheses. Still, there are some papers talking about 
policies that can be adopted to avoid electricity shortage and make the electricity industry better 
in China. 
Let us discuss the 3 categories of argument one by one. First, there is disagreement about 
what the problem really was. In the Seasonal Analysis Report for China’s Industries (zhongguo 
hangye jidu fenxi baogao) (DRCNET 2005), it is believed that China’s electricity industry has 
experienced cycles of electricity shortage and surplus since the late 1960s, driven by economic 
cycles. The ratio between electricity generating capacity and the capacity of electrical equipment 
was taken as an indicator of the cyclical behavior. Tan and Wang (2007) also believed there were 
cycles in the electricity industry and the cycles were closely connected to economic cycles. They 
used elasticity of electricity consumption/generation to GDP growth as the indicator. Elasticity 
circling around 1 indicates cycles in the electricity industry.  
However, in the paper Power Shortage and Water Power Development in Sichuan (sichuan 
quedian yu fazhan shuidian) (Zhu 2004), Zhu discussed what electricity shortage is and argued 
that whether electricity generation can meet the electricity demand can not be taken as a decisive 
indicator. There is still an electricity shortage if capacity margin is not enough. In the paper 
What’s Electricity Shortage? (jiujing shenme shi quedian?), Zhu (2005) argued that China might 
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have never had a real surplus of electricity so far. He pointed out that elasticity of electricity 
consumption/generation to GDP growth can not be regarded as objective indicator of whether 
electricity generating capacity is sufficient or not. Those who think there has been electricity 
surplus in history only according to the elasticity of electricity consumption/generation do not 
have a solid argument. Zhu believed there were two indicators which are reasonable, average 
working hours of generators and capacity margin rate, which has not been a documented feature 
of the electricity industry though.  However, Zhu could not conclude what the problematic 
behavior was in China. 
Other researchers have focused on only recent evidence of shortage. Yang (2004), Liu, Liao 
et al. (2005), Du and You (2007) and Ma and Xu (2006) all asserted a severe electricity shortage 
since 2002, which reached its summit in 2004. Their evidence was the gap of both electricity 
generating capacity and electricity generation in these years.  
I agree with Seasonal Analysis Report for China’s Industries by taking the ratio of electricity 
generating capacity and electricity consuming capacity as an indicator. The ratio exhibits cyclical 
behavior. However, that report did not check carefully whether the center of the cycles was 
within a normal range or not. By looking into that point, I found the ratio was oscillating around a 
center which was far less than the supposed-to-be normal index, less than 0.43, see Figure 9. As a 
result, I think there has been electricity shortage in addition to oscillatory behavior. Zhu made 
very good points, the basic of which this paper relies on. However, neither of those reports used 
quantitative measures. And those who thought the problem was electricity shortage focused only 
on the period since 2002. This paper fills in with quantitative measures by comparing the index 
of China with other countries, over a long time-scale.  
As mentioned above, some of the people who pointed out the electricity problems in China 
gave their hypotheses about the causes for the problem they asserted. They fall into the second 
group. Those who agreed the problem was oscillation in the electricity industry almost shared the 
same hypothesis about the cause, which was economic cycles (DRCNET 2005; Tan and Wang 
2007). When economy is growing fast, demand for electricity grows accordingly. Then the 
profitability of investing in electricity industry also grows, which brings rapid development of 
electricity industry. When economy slows down, demand for electricity also declines. Then it is 
less profitable to invest in electricity industry, when electricity industry comes to its recession. 
Therefore, the development of electricity industry is closely connected to economic development, 
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exhibiting similar cyclical behavior as economy cycles. However, they believed the cycles in 
electricity industry were 3 or 4 years behind economy cycles due to the construction time.  
I do not totally agree with the point of view that electricity cycles were driven by economic 
cycles. There might be some correlation between electricity cycles and economic cycles. 
However, cycles in the electricity industry could arise endogenously, i.e. electricity industry itself 
generates cycles, regardless of economic effect. In this paper, I would like to test my hypotheses 
for the cyclical behavior.  
Among those who agreed the problem was shortage of electricity, there is disagreement 
regarding the reasons for the shortage. Yang (2004) concluded that there were four reasons: too 
rapid economic growth, shortfall of electricity capacity construction, weak electricity grid, and 
inadequate coal supply, since coal is the main source to generate electricity. The four sources all 
make sense, and Yang had given a wide categorization. However, in this paper, I only focus on 
the first two reasons: too rapid economic growth and shortfall of electricity capacity construction 
Because the former drives a high electricity demand and the latter leads to the shortage of 
electricity generating capacity, the two of which make the key aspects of electricity industry: 
electricity demand and supply. Electricity grid is potentially one of the most important parts of 
the electricity industry because it serves the transmission of electricity. However, it causes 
electricity shortage in a totally different way than electricity capacity does, which is not the focus 
of interest in this paper. Coal supply is also indispensable for a reliable electricity supply, 
especially in China, where thermal power accounts for a percentage more than 79% of the total 
electricity generation. However, this paper only concerns about the reasons for shortage from the 
perspective of electricity capacity. Indeed, a deep research into the electricity industry needs a 
comprehensive study of both electricity grid and coal supply. However, in this paper, I have left 
electricity grid and inadequate coal supply to the future research, which is also a potential 
limitation of this paper.  
Liu, Liao et al. (2005) believed electricity shortage, to a large extent, can be attributed to 
low efficiency of using electricity. The electricity used per unit GDP in China is far more than 
that in developed countries. In this sense, the fast-growing GDP in China could have required 
much less electricity than it actually needed. A higher efficiency of using electricity therefore can 
greatly lower the electricity demand, as well as to narrow the gap between electricity generating 
capacity and the desired capacity. I will discuss it later in this paper.  
 8 
Du and You (2007) believed the fact that price of electricity was exclusively determined by 
the government was a very important reason for electricity shortage. They said in the paper that 
even coal price was determined by the market, thus an insensitive price of electricity by the 
government drives investors to seek for cheap coal, which usually has no easy access, thus 
causing coal shortage to some extent. They argued again for the importance of coal, and 
suggested a complete electricity reform. They said even closely associating electricity price with 
coal price, coal shortage can only be alleviated in short time. And the only solution to solve coal 
shortage was the reform in the electricity industry. The pricing of electricity is a key issue in the 
problem of electricity shortage and I will try to evaluate the effect of electricity price in 
electricity demand later in this paper. However, pricing of coal is beyond the boundary of my 
research. 
Ma and Xu (2006) added that imprecise forecast of electricity demand was also a reason for 
the long-term electricity shortage. Their hypothesis was that decision-makers made decisions 
according to the forecast of total electricity demand and that imprecise, often too low, forecast led 
to inappropriate decisions, which led to electricity shortage. Imprecise forecast of electricity 
demand might have caused electricity shortage. However, I would like to go deeper to study why 
the decision-makers made imprecise forecasts, and how to make a better forecast. I will also 
examine whether imprecise forecast of electricity demand was really a decisive cause for 
electricity shortage.  
In a word, I do not totally agree that electricity cycles were caused by economic cycles, 
because cycles could arise endogenously. And I will test both hypotheses. I agree with the 
suggested reasons for electricity shortage by the literature, but I will not include all of them in my 
research and I will go deeper into some of the reasons that I include in the boundary of my 
research, such as too rapid economic growth, shortfall of electricity capacity construction, low 
efficiency of using electricity, imprecise forecast of electricity demand and electricity price 
elasticity of demand. For example, I will model the relationship between economic growth and 
electricity demand, and get quantitative measures about it.  
Finally, there is much research concerning policies to deal with demand. Most of it focuses 
on load sharing, which is to shift some part of peak load to other hours when the load from 
customers is usually lower. This is the so-called Demand Side Management (DSM). The US is 
the first country in the world to adopt DSM, one aspect of which is load shifting, which is to 
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reduce the peak load within 24 hours to avoid power shortage. This aspect of DSM can work well 
to remove power shortage within a day. However, it can not help when there is shortage of 
electricity that could be generated as a whole, because this aspect of DSM by load shifting did 
not reduce the total amount of electricity demand or increase total generation throughout a year. 
This is where my research can fill in, because what I am going to study is the electricity capacity 
shortage averaged over a year. The aim of my research is to help policy-makers make decisions 
about how much capacity to build, annually and in a macro scope.  Another aspect of DSM is to 
improve the electricity-usage efficiency, in order to save energy. This is where my research can 
rely on but will go much deeper to model the efficiency, which is affected by electricity price. 
Then based on the model, I will evaluate how electricity price can improve the efficiency and 
thus reduce the electricity demand. In this sense, my research falls to the category of DSM but 
goes deeper, more tangible and detailed.  
To sum up, this paper first examines what the real problem was in the electricity system, 
based on the disagreement by the literature before. Then the paper focuses on the endogenous 
causes for the cycles in the electricity industry, rather than finding exogenous causes. For the 
causes which are regarded reasonable for the shortage of electricity, the paper leaves some of 
them and narrows down the boundary of research in order to go deeper into some of the causes. 
Finally, in order to compensate one aspect of DSM which focuses on dealing with daily 
electricity demand, the paper looks at decision-making in a macroscopic view, dealing with 
annual total electricity demand. At the same time, the paper relies on another aspect of DSM 
about improving the efficiency of using electricity, but goes much deeper in the field. 
Regarding the methodology adopted in this field, I am going to use system dynamics. And 
this is not the first attempt to model energy problems with system dynamics methodology. Ford 
(2002) used system dynamics modeling to study the boom and bust in power plant construction 
in California. Ford argued that competitive electricity markets were prone to the cycles of boom 
and bust that appear in commodity market. Arango (2006) argued in his PhD dissertation that 
oscillations in the electricity systems could arise from the internal structure of the system. He 
used a system dynamics model and designed an experiment with the model underlying. When an 
investment lag treatment was added, cyclical tendencies exhibited in the electricity generating 
capacity and electricity price. Ford and Arango both successfully used system dynamics to 
illustrate the potential for endogenously generated cycles in deregulated electricity markets. In 
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the paper, I will use System dynamics to study the cycles in China’s electricity industry, which is 
regulated, and the long-term electricity shortage in China. Therefore, I will explore both supply 
and demand side dynamics in this paper, which is an extension of preceding research.  
3 Defining the problem dynamically 
The main problematic behavior over time--the dynamic problem to be addressed in this 
paper is the average shortage of thermal electricity generating capacity, from 1980 to 2005. Why 
the focus is thermal capacity shortage is due to the fact that thermal generation accounts for more 
than 79% of total electricity generation in China. Plus, thermal generators are more reliable than 
hydro power, which is subject to natural conditions, and more flexible than nuclear power in 
terms of capacity utilization rate. One can increase the utilization rate of thermal generators easily 
to satisfy the soaring demand, not beyond the maximum limit of course. Therefore, the shortage 
of total electricity capacity can be attributed to the shortage of thermal capacity. Later in the 
paper, all references to capacity should be understood as references to thermal capacity. The unit 
for generating capacity is Watt, or some equivalent units, such as Gigawatt and Terawatt. Refer 
to Appendix A further for background information about the electricity industry. 
Average capacity shortage  
= Desired capacity – functioning capacity                                                                             ⑴ 
Where, desired capacity is the capacity that would have been needed to satisfy the electricity 
demand when generating capacity is used at its sustainable utilization rate (measured in Gigawatt 
hour per year). Functioning capacity is the capacity that has been finished and is available to 
generate electricity. 
 In reality, generators have to work within a certain range of utilization rate, in order to stay 
in good condition, which can be called a sustainable utilization rate. If generators are kept 
working beyond the sustainable utilization rate, their performance, i.e. reliability, efficiency will 
be decreased and they will be more prone to break down.  
Sustainable utilization rate is interpreted as sustainable hours of generators have been 
working over a year, i.e. average working hours of generators shares the concept of 
“sustainability” and there should be a sustainable range of average working hours for generators. 
We take upper limit of this sustainable range as the benchmark hours, beyond which generators 
 11 
are not supposed to work; or if they do, are not working in a sustainable way. And desired 
capacity is electricity demand that is supposed to be met by thermal generators divided by the 
benchmark hours. However, data about electricity demand is unavailable in reality and it is 
estimated by electricity consumption, which is also electricity generation. See the equation of 
desired capacity below.  
Desired capacity = 
hoursbenchmark 
generation thermal
                                                                               ⑵ 
Average capacity shortage is actually the gap between desired capacity and functioning 
capacity. See the behavior in Figure 3, which is called a reference mode. Reference mode is a 
graphical description of dynamic problem, which is gap between desired capacity and functioning 
capacity over time.  
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Figure 3 Gap Between Desired and Functioning Capacity in China 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration, United States 
            World Conventional Thermal Electricity Installed Capacity, January 1, 1980-January 1, 2005 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/electricitycapacity.html  
             World Net Conventional Thermal Electricity Generation, Most Recent Annual Estimates, 1980-
2006  
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/electricitygeneration.html 
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Figure 3 is derived according to equation ⑴ and ⑵, with data about thermal generation and 
functioning capacity available. However, it is also based on an assumption that the average 
working hours of thermal generators is supposed to be no more than 5000 hours, the benchmark 
hours mentioned above, which will be explained later in the section. 
We can see oscillations in the reference mode. Plus, the gap between desired capacity and 
functioning capacity has been bigger than 0 most of the time, which indicates capacity shortage. 
However, the oscillations seem to have become bigger and bigger over time. In order to get 
insight into it, I will analyze the reference mode in the following.  
Actually, the reference mode shown in Figure 3 is a combination of 3 characteristic 
behaviors, exhibited by 2 other variables. The historical behaviors of these 2 variables are also 
reference modes, which give more ways to look at the dynamic problem. 
The first one is exponential growth in the functioning capacity, see Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 Functioning Thermal Capacity in China 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration, United States 
            World Conventional Thermal Electricity Installed Capacity, January 1, 1980-January 1, 2005 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/electricitycapacity.html  
 
The second one is oscillation in the average working hours of thermal generators, which is 
consistent with the oscillations in Figure 3. See Figure 5 below. 
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Figure 5 Average Working Hours of Thermal Generators in China 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration, United States 
            World Conventional Thermal Electricity Installed Capacity, January 1, 1980-January 1, 2005 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/electricitycapacity.html  
             World Net Conventional Thermal Electricity Generation, Most Recent Annual Estimates, 1980-
2006  
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/electricitygeneration.html 
 
From Figure 5 it is not difficult to see that average working hours of thermal generators 
were above 5000 hours most of time, only less from 1997 to 2001. This is consistent with Figure 
3, where gap between desired capacity and functioning capacity has been above 0 most of time. 
This indicates the third characteristic behavior in the reference mode is short of goal, which can 
be called sluggish adjustment. Sluggish adjustment is the inability to arrive at a designated goal 
(Saeed 1998). The goal in this case is the desired capacity. 
In conclusion, there are 3 reference modes for the dynamic problem to be addressed in this 
paper. The characteristic behaviors in the reference modes shown in Figure 3, Figure 4 and 
Figure 5 are exponential growth, oscillations and sluggish adjustment. The dynamic problems to 
be addressed in this paper are oscillations and sluggish adjustment over time.  
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In the following, I will first explain why the reference mode in Figure 3 can be broken into 
the reference mode in Figure 4 and Figure 5.  
First, definitions of some abbreviation letters: 
T: thermal electricity generation 
C: capacity 
G: gap between desired and functioning capacity 
H: average working hours 
Suppose the annual thermal electricity generation of the i th year is Ti ( 20051980 ≤≤ i ), the 
thermal capacity of the i th year is Ci ( 20051980 ≤≤ i ), gap between functioning and desired 
thermal capacity in the i th year is Gi ( 20051980 ≤≤ i ), and average working hours of thermal 
generators in the i th year is Hi ( 20051980 ≤≤ i ). 
Then iii C
TG −=
5000
 
While iii HCT ∗= , 
So )5000(*
5000
)1
5000
(
5000
−=−=−
∗
= i
ii
ii
ii
i H
CHCCHCG  
So Gi can be broken up into Ci and (Hi -5000). Therefore the characteristic of Gi is the 
combination of Ci and (Hi -5000). Gi is shown in Figure 3, Ci is shown in Figure 4 (exponential 
growth), and Hi is shown in Figure 5 (oscillation and short of goal), from which (Hi -5000) is 
easy to get. 
Then in the following, I will answer the questions left unanswered or at least not answered 
to the detail above: 
1. Why shortage of total generating capacity can be attributed to shortage of thermal 
capacity? 
2. How comes the 5000 hours as the limited average working hours?  
Why shortage of total generating capacity can be attributed to shortage of thermal capacity? 
First, in China, thermal power accounts for a very large percentage, more than 79%, see 
Figure 6. It’s a dominating source of electricity. Although hydro power has been growing rapidly, 
not as fast as thermal power though, there is a limit to the growth. It is estimated by the 
International Energy Outlook 2006 (Energy Information Administration 2006) that the total 
electricity generating capacity in China will reach 1186 Gigawatt in 2020, while it is stated in 
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General Situation of Water Resources in China (China Electric Power Information Center) that 
the total exploitable hydro power capacity is 378 Gigawatt. This means hydro power capacity 
will account for no more than 31.8% of the total generating capacity even if all the hydro power 
resources in China has been exploited.  
 
 Figure 6 Percentage of Electricity Generation by Thermal Power Plants in China 
 
Source:  China Market Research Report Network  
Change in the Percentage of Electricity Generation by Thermal Power Plants in China (1990 
2005) 
               http://www.chinahyyj.com/news/w_2007050909139862513.html      
 
Second, electricity generation by hydro power plants and nuclear power plants can not be 
extended when needed to. One can not force hydro power generators to produce electricity when 
there is no enough water level in the dam, no matter how urgently electricity is desired. Likewise, 
nuclear power generators, which account for 2.12% of China’s electricity generation in 2005 
(Energy Information Administration 2005), work at a nearly fixed utilization rate, which is 
determined by the nuclear fuel given. And it is difficult to adjust the utilization rate of nuclear 
generators once the nuclear fuel is given. Therefore, whenever there is electricity shortage, 
thermal capacity is the only one possible to adjust. In this sense, shortage in the total generating 
capacity can be attributed to shortage in thermal power capacity. 
No more than 5000 hours 
Now I will justify the assumption of “no more than 5000 hours”, which serves as an 
important criterion of whether there is capacity shortage or surplus. Let us first define what 
capacity utilization rate is.  
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Capacity utilization rate, as its name implies, is the ratio of actual output to the potential 
output of a capacity. But potential output can be defined in two ways. One is the "engineering" or 
"technical" definition, according to which potential output represents the maximum amount of 
output that can be produced in the short-run with the existent stock of capital. Thus, a standard 
definition of capacity utilization is the (weighted) average of the ratio between the actual output 
of capacity to the maximum that could be produced per unit of time, with existing plant and 
equipment (Johanson 1968). Obviously, "output" could be measured in physical units or in 
market values, but in this paper it is measured in watt or Gigawatt, i.e. physical units. However, 
as output increases and well before the absolute physical limit of production is reached, most 
firms (electricity generation companies) might well experience an increase in the average cost of 
production (even if there is no change in the level of plant & equipment used). For example, 
higher average costs can arise, because of the need to operate extra shifts, undertake additional 
plant maintenance, and so on. This is why an alternative approach, sometimes called the 
"economic" utilization rate, is used to measure the ratio of actual output to the level of output, 
beyond which the average cost of production begins to rise. In this case, surveyed firms are asked 
by how much it would be practicable for them to raise production from existing plant and 
equipment, without raising unit costs (Berndt and Morrison 1981).  
Take US for example, in the Federal Reserve Board (US) estimates of capacity utilization 
for a given industry, the capacity utilization rate is equal to an output index (seasonally adjusted) 
divided by a capacity index.  The Federal Reserve Board's capacity indexes attempt to capture the 
concept of sustainable maximum output – the greatest level of output a plant can maintain within 
the framework of a realistic work schedule, after factoring in normal downtime and assuming 
sufficient availability of inputs to operate the capital in place (Federal Reserve Statistical 
Release). In a word, the capacity utilization rate is actually the “economic” utilization rate 
mentioned above. Therefore, by dividing the actual average working hours of thermal generators 
by the capacity utilization rate in American electric industry, we get the maximum sustainable 
average working hours of thermal generators. However, data about yearly capacity utilization rate 
is unavailable. What is available is the average capacity utilization rate in the American electric 
industry from 1992 to 2007. We can therefore get a rough estimate of maximum sustainable 
average working hours of thermal generators in US by dividing the actual average working hours 
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of thermal generators by the average capacity utilization rate in American electric industry, see 
Table 1. 
Table 1 Maximum Sustainable Average Working Hours of Thermal Generators in US 
 
Year Maximum Sustainable  Average Working Hours Year 
Maximum Sustainable  
Average Working Hours 
1980 4554.87  1993 4749.07  
1981 4412.32  1994 4760.70  
1982 4038.40  1995 4774.52  
1983 4093.85  1996 4817.36  
1984 4239.00  1997 4969.37  
1985 4267.45  1998 5210.00  
1986 4182.74  1999 5176.21  
1987 4376.55  2000 5185.51  
1988 4566.39  2001 4863.26  
1989 4682.94  2002 4566.91  
1990 4597.64  2003 4351.62  
1991 4565.14  2004 4371.04  
1992 4595.93  2005 4433.50  
 
Source: Energy Information Administration, United States 
            World Conventional Thermal Electricity Installed Capacity, January 1, 1980-January 1, 2005 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/electricitycapacity.html  
             World Net Conventional Thermal Electricity Generation, Most Recent Annual Estimates, 1980-
2006  
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/electricitygeneration.html 
Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization 
Table 7 Capacity Utilization, Percent of capacity, seasonally adjusted 
      Federal Reserve Statistical Release  
Note: Assuming the capacity utilization rate of thermal power plants is the same as the other type of power 
plants in US, which is 86.7% on average from 1972 to 2007. 
 
We can get Figure 7 directly from Table 1, which is easier for us to get the maximum 
sustainable working hours of thermal generators. 
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Figure 7 Estimates of Maximum Sustainable Average Working Hours of Thermal Generators in US 
 
It is obvious in Figure 7 that maximum sustainable working hours of thermal generators in 
US has been stably among 4000~5000 hours, while most of time it is less than 5000, except 3 
years from 1998 to 2000. Therefore, it is not a haste to say the maximum sustainable average 
working hours of thermal generators in US is no more than 5000 hours. As known to us all, US 
have been playing a leading role in almost all the technological fields in the world. In the mean 
while, the electricity industry in developed countries on average is more advanced than that in 
developing countries, including China. Therefore, it is logical to expect the maximum sustainable 
average working hours of thermal generators in China to be no more than 5000 hours.   
In order to make the conclusion that there has been shortage in the thermal capacity more 
solid, the paper develops some implicit indicators of electricity shortage in the following in the 
absence of explicit indicators (exact desired thermal capacity). 
1. Actual average working hours 
Actual average working hours of thermal generators every year is an important indicator of 
whether capacity is sufficient. As above mentioned, there has not been an absolute way in the 
world to calculate exactly the maximum sustainable average working hours. Therefore, this paper 
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will resort to comparing the actual average working hours of thermal capacity in China and some 
other developed countries.  
As shown in Figure 8, comparison was made between China (CH), United States (US), 
Canada (CA), Denmark (DA), Netherlands (NL), United Kingdom (UK), Japan (JA) and Ireland 
(EI), all of them with a percentage of electricity generation by thermal plants ranging from 63% 
to 87%, while for China is 81.04%, according to Energy Information Administration. See Figure 
8. 
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Figure 8 Average Working Hours of Thermal Generators among Several Countries 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration, United States 
            World Conventional Thermal Electricity Installed Capacity, January 1, 1980-January 1, 2005 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/electricitycapacity.html  
             World Net Conventional Thermal Electricity Generation, Most Recent Annual Estimates, 1980-
2006  
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/electricitygeneration.html 
As shown in Figure 8, except Ireland, in which average working hours of thermal generators 
exceeded that of China in some years, average working hours of thermal generators in China 
were always more than other countries, except that around 1999, the average working hours 
decreased and reached its nadir, which was around 4500 hours.  
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In a word, it is not in a haste to say that average working hours of thermal generators in 
China were more than the world average, which to some extent indicates a shortage of electricity 
generating capacity.  
In the meanwhile, as shown in Figure 8, the world average working hours of thermal 
generators seems to be around 4000 hours. Therefore, taking 5000 hours to be the criteria of 
whether there is capacity shortage or not is a conservative act.  
2. Electricity generating capacity VS Capacity of electricity-consuming equipment 
The ratio of electricity generating capacity to capacity of electricity-consuming equipment is 
also an important indicator of whether there is electricity shortage or surplus, as referred to 
Seasonal Analysis Report for China’s Industries (DRCNET 2005). Unfortunately, this ratio is not 
used in statistics in other countries of the world. It is believed by DRCNET that when the ratio is 
more than 0.45 (DRCNET, 2005), there is a surplus of electricity, and a shortage is believed to 
exist when the ratio is less than 0.45. For most of the years from 1981 to 2001, the ratio is less 
than 0.45. See Table 2 and Figure 9. (Here the electricity generating capacity is the total 
generating capacity, rather than thermal capacity only, and capacity of electricity-consuming 
equipment is also the total capacity. The same concept of “total capacity” also applies to capacity 
margin to be discussed later. This is because it does not make sense to assume that some 
electricity-consuming equipment uses only thermal electricity or hydro electricity. However, to 
use total capacity here does not change the conclusion because shortage in total generating 
capacity indicates shortage in thermal capacity, as discussed above.) 
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Table 2 Capacity of Electricity Generating Capacity VS Capacity of Electricity-Consuming Equipment 
 
Source:  State Power Information Network 
China Electric Power Information Center 
Ratio of electricity generating capacity over capacity of electrical equipment from 1980 to 2001 
              http://www.sp.com.cn/zgdl/dltj/d0102.htm 
 
Figure 9 is derived directly from Table 2, which makes it easier to read and see the 
tendencies of changing.  
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Figure 9 Ratio of Electricity Generating Capacity over Electricity-Consuming Capacity 
 
By putting the graph of ratio and graph of average working hours into one graph, we can 
find there’s consistency between them. In order to make a good comparison, average working 
hours of thermal generators is standardized instead of the original data. The standardization is 
first dividing average working hours by 9000 hours in order to make it dimensionless and the 
ratio (standardized average working hours) between 0.5 and 1. Then 1 minus the ratio is taken as 
the standardized average working hours of thermal generators, so that the two curves can run in 
the same direction, making it easier to examine the two graphs. See Figure 10. 
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Figure 10 Consistency Between Two Different Indicators 
 
As shown in Figure 10, the two curves almost overlapped each other and the trend of the 
two curves is almost the same.  
3. Capacity margin 
Capacity margin is another important indicator of whether the existing capacity is enough to 
ensure a reliable electricity supply, according to Zhu (2005). 
Capacity margin can be described as the capacity required to ensure that the expected 
demand of the system is met even under situations of unexpected failure of generation during 
system peak demand or unusual or unanticipated increases in demand. Capacity margin rate is 
capacity margin over peak load in a year.  
Capacity margin rate = %100*
loadpeak  annual
loadpeak  annual-capacity generating reliable
                     ⑶ 
Capacity margin rate has already been calculated as an important index in several countries, 
such as Australia, Canada, Demark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom and United 
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States. Figure 11  is the capacity margin in Contiguous US from 1995 to 2006, which is above 
15% most of the time.  
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Figure 11 Capacity Margin Rate in Contiguous US 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration, United States 
             Electric Power Annual 2006 
Net Internal Demand, Capacity Resources, and Capacity Margins by North American Electric 
Reliability Council Region, Summer, 1995 through 2006 
                      http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa_sum.html  
 
In China, capacity margin has not been a documented feature of the electricity industry. 
There’s no official document regulating reliable generating capacity and annual peak load, so it is 
difficult to attain data about capacity margin rate.  
However, some assumptions can be made about reliable generating capacity and peak load. 
Suppose reliable generating capacity is 80%~93% (China Electric Power Information Center) of 
the total installed capacity. Also, suppose peak load in every year is 35%  (China Electricity 
Council 2005)~45% (The maximum percentage without making capacity margin negative, 
because according Figure 9, installed generating capacity is less than 45% of total capacity of 
electricity-consuming equipment.) of the capacity of electricity-consuming equipment.  
Therefore, based on these assumptions, 
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Capacity margin rate 
=
%100*
capacity consumingy electricit*45%)~(35%
capacity consumingy electricit*45%)~(35%-capacity generating installed*) 93%~(80%
                                                                                                                                                        ⑷ 
According to the electricity-generating and electricity-consuming capacity in Table 2, we 
got Figure 12. 
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Figure 12 Maximum and Minimum Limit of Capacity Margin Rate in China 
 
Source:  State Power Information Network 
China Electric Power Information Center 
Ratio of electricity generating capacity over capacity of electrical equipment from 1980 to 2001 
              http://www.sp.com.cn/zgdl/dltj/d0102.htm 
              Main technical and economic index (1952-2001) 
              http://www.sp.com.cn/zgdl/dltj/d0105.htm   
China Electricity Council 
Annual report of electricity industry in 2005  
   
As shown in Figure 12, the capacity margin rate in China is below 15% most of time, in 
some years even less than 10%. China’s GDP has been growing at a higher rate than the US. 
Electricity demand has a large potential to increase, unlike US, whose electricity market has been 
mature for a long time. Therefore, China is supposed to have a bigger capacity margin rate than 
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US, in order to ensure a reliable domestic electricity supply. In the meanwhile, State Electricity 
Regulatory Commission, China (1994) regulates in Methods of Implementing Gird Coordination 
and Management Byelaw (dianwang diaodu guanli tiaoli shishi banfa), NO. 23 that the total 
capacity margin rate is not supposed to be less than 20%.  Due to the rapid economic growth rate 
in China, capacity margin rate needs to be even higher than 20% in order to ensure a secure 
electricity supply and meet the roaring electricity demand.  
We can combine the capacity margin in Figure 12 with the two other indicators discussed 
above, see Figure 13. 
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Figure 13 Consistency Found in All the Implicit Indicators 
 
Therefore, there is evidence that China has experienced long-term electricity generating 
capacity shortage ever since 1980. Even if from 1997 to 2001 China was not suffering from 
severe shortage of electricity, electricity shortage still dominated in the history of China’s 
electricity industries in the past few decades.  
However, in order to gain a deeper insight into the whole problem, it is better to look at the 
data for indicators before 1980 also, starting from 1965. Since only data about average working 
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hours is available, let us trace back to average working hours of thermal generators starting from 
1965. See Figure 14. (Here, the focus is to discover the characteristic behavior in the average 
working hours of thermal generators in China.) 
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Figure 14 Average Working Hours of Thermal Generators in China from 1965 to 2005 
 
Source:  State Power Information Network 
China Electric Power Information Center 
Hydro and thermal power composition in both installed capacity and electricity generation from 
1952 to 2001 
                      http://www.sp.com.cn/zgdl/dltj/d0104.htm  
Energy Information Administration, United States 
            World Conventional Thermal Electricity Installed Capacity, January 1, 1980-January 1, 2005 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/electricitycapacity.html  
             World Net Conventional Thermal Electricity Generation, Most Recent Annual Estimates, 1980-
2006  
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/electricitygeneration.html 
 
As shown in Figure 14, the center around which average working hours of thermal 
generators is oscillating is more than 5000 hours. Therefore, to this point, we can believe there 
has been long-term shortage in thermal capacity in China in the past decades.    
However, what is shown in Figure 14 is for the purpose of further substantiating the 
reference modes which were discussed at the beginning of this section. The dynamic problem to 
be addressed is the gap between desired and functioning capacity, which could be expressed with 
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the help of functioning capacity and average working hours of thermal generators. Thus here I 
repeat the reference modes of capacity gap, functioning capacity and average working hours. See 
graphs below.     
Gap Between Desired Capacity and Functioning Capacity
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Functioning Thermal Capacity in China
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Average Working Hours of Thermal Generators in China
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4 Dynamic hypothesis 
As shown in the reference modes above, there are oscillations in the gap between desired 
and functioning capacity. Plus, the gap has been non-negative most of the time. This reflects in 
the oscillations in the average working hours and they are above 5000 hours most of time. This 
section will offer a tentative explanation, a hypothesis for the problematic dynamic behavior, i.e. 
a dynamic hypothesis. The dynamic hypothesis will be given by both causal loop diagram and 
stock and flow diagram. 
4.1 Causal loop diagram    
As discussed before, the characteristic behaviors in the reference modes are oscillation, 
exponential growth and sluggish adjustment. A major counteracting feedback loop with 
significant delays could be responsible for oscillatory behavior (Sterman 2000). Exponential 
growth could be caused by a positive feedback loop, either endogenous or exogenous. As for 
sluggish adjustment, it could occur when the decision makers have a wrong goal, a goal that is 
lower than what it is actually. Sluggish adjustment can also occur when the counteracting 
feedback loops in the system are too weak to properly adjust the system to its goal. Let us first 
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see the hypothesis for oscillation.   
The major counteracting feedback loops in the electricity industry are shown in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15 Causal Loop Diagram: Feedback Loops in the Capacity Construction Sector, including Structure 
Responsible for Oscillations in the Reference Mode 
 
As shown in Figure 15, Loop C3 is a major counteracting feedback loop with more than one 
delay, which could cause oscillations in the reference mode. Usually NDRC compares the 
functioning capacity with desired capacity, and sees the gap between them. Then they will start 
constructing new capacity in order to close the gap. However, there is a big delay from the new 
capacity being constructed to the capacity being finished. The new capacity being constructed 
accumulates as the capacity under construction, which appears to be ignored by NDRC. NDRC 
keeps closing the gap according to their estimates about the gap, while ignoring some capacity is 
on the way to be delivered. Loop C3 has some similarity in Figure 16, the generic behavior and 
structure of oscillation. The structure in Figure 16 is also a major counteracting feedback loop 
with significant delays. Refer to the Appendix B about system dynamics principles.  
4.1.1 Oscillation 
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Figure 16 Oscillation: Structure and Behavior 
Source: John D. Sterman 
Business Dynamics Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World  
(Sterman, 2000) 
The exponential growth exhibited in the reference mode of functioning capacity could be 
caused by an exogenous positive feedback loop, GDP in this case. The loop driving GDP is not 
shown explicitly in the paper. However, GDP grows at some growth rate every year (Figure 18), 
which must be driven by a positive feedback loop. Exponential growth in GDP causes 
exponential growth in total electricity demand, which finally causes exponential growth in 
desired capacity, which is a goal of the construction system. Therefore, functioning capacity 
exhibited exponential growth. 
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Figure 17 Causal Diagram: Structure Responsible for Exponential Growth in Reference Mode 
 
4.1.2 Exponential growth 
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See the real GDP in China in Figure 18. GDP exhibited exponential growth.  
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Figure 18 Real GDP in China from 1980 to 2005 
 
Source:  National Bureau of Statistics of China (2007)              
Gross Domestic Product 
              http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2007/indexch.htm  
              Global Econ Data 
China, GDP deflator, 1980~2006 
              http://www.econstats.com/weo/C035V021.htm  
 
Now let us move to sluggish adjustment. Sluggish adjustment is the inability to arrive at a 
designated goal, enough capacity in this case. It is a pervasive problem both in physical and 
social systems with inadequate feedback tracking discrepancy, although this phenomenon occurs 
together with other patterns (Saeed, 1998), oscillation in this case. Sluggish adjustment usually 
results from an inappropriate goal or a weak balancing feedback loop. Now let us combine Figure 
16 and Figure 17 into one big causal loop diagram to see how sluggish adjustment occurs. 
4.1.3 Sluggish adjustment 
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Figure 19 Causal Loop Diagram: Overall, including Sluggish Adjustment in Reference Mode 
 
        As shown in Figure 19, when GDP grows exponentially, it causes desired capacity to grow 
exponentially, eventually functioning capacity and capacity depreciation. In order to make 
functioning capacity keep up with desired capacity, capacity under construction should be big 
enough to ensure a big enough construction finish, which adds to functioning capacity. Since 
there is a delay (construction time) from capacity under construction to construction finish, the 
longer the construction time, the bigger capacity under construction should be and this requires 
big construction start. However, there is no causal relationship between the construction time and 
construction start in Figure 19. Therefore, ignorance of construction time when deciding 
construction start could be a reason for capacity shortage.  
There is a delay from thermal generation to estimated electricity demand (desired capacity). 
There is also a delay from growth rate of GDP and growth rate of electricity efficiency to 
estimated growth rate of total demand, which is added to construction start. There is also a delay 
from capacity depreciation to construction start, so there is also an underestimate of capacity 
depreciation, especially when capacity depreciation is growing exponentially. Therefore, 
underestimates of demand and an underestimate of capacity depreciation could also be the reason 
for electricity capacity shortage.  
Fast growth rate of China’s GDP and improper electricity pricing mechanism add to the 
capacity shortage. When GDP grows rapidly, and it drives rapid growth in electricity demand if 
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electricity intensity fail to decrease enough so as to offset part of the growth in GDP, which can 
be caused by inactive electricity price. The faster the growth is in GDP (electricity demand) and 
the slower growth in electricity intensity, the more it is possible to underestimate electricity 
demand (desired capacity) and capacity depreciation.  
There is one thing to note that in Figure 19, there is no link from functioning capacity to 
thermal generation, which is due to the fact that thermal generation is driven by electricity 
demand, rather than functioning capacity. However, thermal generation is constrained by 
functioning capacity for sure. I will take this into account in the stock and flow diagram and 
model formulation part, so as to make the model robust under extreme conditions. 
In conclusion, loop C3 could be responsible for oscillations in the gap between desired 
capacity and functioning capacity and in the average working hours of thermal generators in the 
past decades. Ignorance of construction time when deciding construction start could be the reason 
for capacity shortage. Underestimates about electricity demand (desired capacity) and capacity 
depreciation could also be part of the reasons for capacity shortage. Too fast growth in GDP and 
improper electricity pricing, which fails to reduce electricity intensity, add to the underestimates 
and thus add to capacity shortage. 
Here is a boundary chart for the model developed in this paper. 
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Figure 20 Boundary Chart of Studied System 
 
Note: 1-beyond boundary; 2-exogenous variables; 3-endogenous variables 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 lists all the variables that are out of boundary and exogenous variables and explains 
why. The endogenous variables will be left later in the section when I construct stock and flow 
diagram of the model. 
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Table 3 Explanation about Variables That Are Out of Boundary and Exogenous Variables 
Variables out of boundary Why 
coal reserves coal can not help when there is no generating 
capacity 
Coal price Coal price determines cost of electricity, which is beyond boundary  
grid capacity grid capacity does not produce electricity  
hydro capacity the focus of this paper is thermal capacity  
nuclear capacity the focus of this paper is thermal capacity  
Exogenous variables  
GDP GDP is affected by many factors which are beyond boundary  
Electricity intensity 
There is a trend for electricity intensity to decline 
over time, even without the effect of electricity 
price 
Electricity price 
Electricity price is hardly affected by the feedback 
from the model during the time period under study, 
from 1980 to 2005 
percentage of thermal capacity the percentage is very stable 
4.2 Decision rules of electricity capacity construction 
Before we move to the stock and flow diagram of the model, I will explain the decision rules 
of electricity capacity construction, to gain confidence in the causal loop diagrams discussed 
above and the model itself that will be discussed later in this section.  
My hypothesis about how decision makers, the NDRC makes decisions is as follows, 
divided in several steps: 
a) Forecast annual total electricity demand, which is based on past electricity consumption 
(Xu 2006). Then forecast the growth rate of demand and add to past electricity 
consumption so as to get electricity demand forecast, according to what Wang Yeping, 
General Manager of South Grid Company, which is one of two grid monopolies in China, 
said in his report to NDRC about 11th five-year plan and 2020 long-term target for 
electrical power industry (Wang 2003). The growth rate of demand is based on GDP 
growth and change in electricity intensity, according to Seasonal Analysis Report for 
China’s Industries (zhongguo hangye jidu fenxi baogao) (DRCNET 2005). 
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b) Decide how much demand has to be satisfied by thermal generators, according to the 
percentage of electricity generation thermal power accounts for. 
c) Calculate the desired capacity of thermal generators based on the estimate of electricity 
demand and benchmark working hour of generators. 
d) Calculate the gap between existing (functioning) capacity and desired capacity.  
e) Average the depreciated generators in the past year and compensate the capacity in the next 
year. 
f) Close the gap with some time period, at least implicitly, in mind.  
         NDRC does not invest directly in the capacity construction after 1985. Multiple types of 
investors, as discussed in Section 1, are those who invest directly. However, they need to apply to 
NDRC for the license to construct capacity. NDRC then decides whether to approve the 
application or not. The only drive for investors to invest capacity is the profitability of investment, 
which depends on potential electricity demand and the difference between electricity price and 
cost. However, NDRC does guide the investors to properly invest (close the gap between desired 
capacity and functioning capacity), through administrative or financial or tax measures, or even 
electricity price. But these measures are beyond the boundary of my research. Any way, NDRC 
has the capacity to control capacity construction start, making it more or less equal to their 
estimates of the gap of capacity.  
There is great similarity in the decision rules and the generic structure of oscillation (Figure 
16) and sluggish adjustment.  The first 3 steps of decision-making are to find the goal of the 
generating capacity. Then comparing the functioning capacity with the goal gets the discrepancy, 
step d). Then decision makers decide how quickly to adjust the capacity to the goal, step f). This 
period of adjustment time and the time it takes for NDRC to coordinate with investors are the 
administrative and decision making delays. Then new capacity is started construction in order to 
close the gap. However, usually it takes about 3 years for a thermal power generator to be 
finished and start to generate electricity. This construction time is the action delay. Therefore, the 
decision-making rules are completely consistent with the generic structure of oscillation. 
However, whether the decision-making rules are consistent with the way NDRC really makes 
decisions needs to be tested through model validation, which will be discussed in the model 
validation part.  
Regarding to sluggish adjustment, as discussed above, when deciding construction start, no 
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thought is given to the time delays of construction (construction time) thus capacity under 
construction is not big enough to ensure the as fast growth in functioning capacity as in desired 
capacity. Continual underestimates in the growth rate of total electricity demand and capacity 
depreciation can also be the source of capacity shortage. Too fast growth in GDP and slow 
decline in electricity intensity, which could be caused by the ineffective pricing mechanism, 
drives fast growth in electricity demand, which adds to the underestimates.  
In the following I will explain the origin of the causal loop diagrams, using stock and flow 
diagrams. It is explained in the same sequence as in causal loop diagram: structures responsible 
for oscillation, exponential growth and sluggish adjustment as a whole.  
4.3 Stock & Flow Diagram 
In this part, I will discuss stock and flow diagram in the exactly in the same sequence as 
causal loop diagram. First, I will give the stock and flow diagram of capacity construction sector, 
which includes the structure responsible for oscillations in the reference mode. Then I will give 
the stock and flow diagram of demand sector, which includes the structure responsible for 
exponential growth in functioning capacity. Afterwards, I will combine the two sectors into one 
and discuss why there is sluggish adjustment. 
functioning
capacity
capacity under
construction construction
finishing
construction start capacity
depreciation
desired capacity
capacity
adjustment time
construction time average life span
gap of capacity
estimated capacity
depreciation
time to estimate
capacity depreciation
estimated growth
rate of demand
 
Figure 21 Stock and Flow Diagram: Capacity Construction Sector, including Structure Responsible for 
Oscillation in the Reference Mode 
4.3.1 Oscillation 
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First I will explain the structure in Figure 21 step by step. Capacity can be seen as the 
equivalent of an accumulation of generators. So it can be conceptualized as a stock, the unit of 
which is Gigawatt. We call this stock of capacity functioning capacity, which is the capacity that 
has been finished and is ready to generate electricity. Every year there is some new capacity 
added to the stock, while at the same time some old capacity is depreciated, after an average life 
span.  
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Figure 22 Stock and Flow Diagram of Capacity: One Stock 
 
We can conceptualize another stock called capacity under construction, because it takes time 
to build capacity. All the capacity that is being constructed accumulates in this stock. 
capacity under
construction
functioning
capacityconstruction start construction
finishing
capacity
depreciation
average life spanconstruction time
 
Figure 23 Stock and Flow Diagram of Capacity: Two Stocks 
 
As mentioned above, we hypothesize that decision makers take the capacity that is 
depreciated into consideration when deciding construction start, i.e., the capacity depreciated has 
to be compensated afterwards; otherwise there would be steady state error. See Figure 24 below. 
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Figure 24 Stock and Flow Diagram of Capacity: Considering Depreciation 
 
Our hypothesis is that construction start is driven by the gap between functioning capacity 
and desired capacity, because capacity has to keep up with desired capacity all the time, which is 
the goal of functioning capacity. The decision-makers compare what is available (functioning 
capacity) with what is needed (desired capacity) and calculate the discrepancy, then make a 
decision about how quickly to adjust the situation. When they decide construction start, they add 
to the growth factor of demand, which is the multiplication of desired capacity and estimated 
growth rate of demand. Until now, we finish the capacity construction sector, including structure 
that we hypothesize is responsible for oscillation in the reference mode. I will repeat it below and 
discuss about oscillations afterwards. 
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Ignorance about the stock of capacity under construction is the cause for oscillation in the 
reference mode, given capacity under construction is the main delay in the big feedback loop 
from construction start to functioning capacity to gap of capacity, which then feedbacks to 
construction start. However, one might argue that since it takes long to construct capacity, how 
can the NDRC ignore such a big stock? Well, this could be a good point, but there has been no 
literature, even some implicit clue about how NDRC treats the stock of capacity under 
construction. They might have a rough estimate about it but that does not necessarily mean they 
ever tried to manage the stock. Therefore, for the time being, I will leave it but will test it later. 
 
Now, let us show the stock and flow diagram of demand sector, which includes the structure 
responsible for exponential growth in functioning capacity, corresponding to Figure 17. 
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Figure 25 Stock and Flow Diagram: Structure Responsible for Exponential Growth in Reference Mode 
 
As before, I will explain the structure in Figure 25 step by step. Desired capacity is derived 
from estimated electricity demand that is met by thermal generation, divided by benchmark 
working hours. Electricity demand is estimated according to past thermal generation. Thermal 
generation is driven by total electricity demand, and is a percentage of total demand, if 
functioning thermal capacity is sufficient to meet the demand. As discussed in causal loop 
diagram section, thermal generation is constrained by functioning capacity available. How the 
4.3.2 Exponential growth 
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constraint works will be discussed later when Figure 25 and Figure 21 are combined into one. 
See Figure 26, from total demand to desired capacity. 
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Figure 26 Stock and Flow Diagram: Desired Capacity 
As shown in Figure 26, total electricity demand is determined by real GDP and electricity 
intensity, which is electricity demand per real GDP.   
As discussed above, decision makers take into account the growth rate of demand when 
forecasting future demand. My hypothesis is that they add the growth rate of demand to 
construction start. But how they estimate the growth rate of demand? My hypothesis is that they 
estimate the growth rate of real GDP and electricity intensity first, and then estimate the growth 
rate of demand according to them. See Figure 27. 
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Figure 27 Stock and Flow Diagram: Estimated Growth Rate of Demand 
 
There is an assumption made in Figure 27, which is that decision makers estimate the 
growth rate of real GDP and electricity intensity according to past growth rate. There is evidence 
that they figure out the past growth rate on a yearly basis, i.e. to compare real GDP over a time 
period with real GDP over the same period last year. The National Bureau of Statistics and the 
State Power Information Network both make such comparisons.    
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Now let us combine Figure 25 and Figure 21 to get the full stock and flow diagram, see 
Figure 28. 
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Figure 28 Stock and Flow Diagram: Over All, including Sluggish Adjustment in Reference Mode 
 
First about functioning capacity, thermal generation and total electricity demand. Indeed, 
thermal generation is driven by electricity demand. However, it is also constrained by functioning 
capacity. When functioning capacity is not enough, managers will increase the capacity 
utilization rate of generators so that practically they will work more average working hours in 
order to meet electricity demand. It takes days or hours to adjust capacity utilization rate, 
depending on which type of thermal generators. But it can be regarded as instant over the time 
horizon I am studying, from 1980 to 2005. However, this is a limit to average working hours, i.e. 
its maximum can not exceed 8760 hours, which is the total hour in a year. Therefore, when 
average working hours that is needed to meet the demand is less than 8760 hours, electricity 
demand determines thermal generation. Otherwise, functioning capacity determines thermal 
generation. Thermal generation is actually a minimum of demand and capacity.  
Now let us discuss the overall structure in Figure 28. Electricity capacity is always trying to 
keep up with total electricity demand, thus exhibiting exponential growth, which is exhibited in 
capacity depreciation as well. However, the electricity demand has been increasing all the time, 
4.3.3 Sluggish adjustment 
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due to the fast-growing GDP and slow decline in electricity intensity. Increasing demand drives 
desired capacity to be increasing all the time. On one hand, there could be always underestimates 
of total demand and capacity depreciation, which could be a reason for capacity shortage when 
deciding construction start. On the other hand, it takes time for capacity construction to be 
finished. Suppose at one moment functioning capacity catches up with desired capacity, it will be 
difficult for it to keep up with rising desired capacity, unless there is a big stock of capacity under 
construction, which keeps sending new capacity to the stock of functioning capacity. However, 
when deciding construction start, the time delay of construction (construction time) is not taken 
into account, thus making it impossible for functioning capacity to keep up with fast increasing 
desired capacity. 
As discussed in the causal loop diagram section, major counteracting feedback loop C3, 
which includes the stock of capacity under construction, is the reason for oscillations in the 
reference mode. Tests about this will be made in model validation section. Now let us move to 
next section: model formulation.  
4.4 Model Formulation 
In this section, I will formulate the model, in the same sequence as in stock and flow 
diagram section, sector by sector. 
1) Capacity construction sector 
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See the equations for this sector in Table 4. 
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Table 4 Equations for Capacity Sector 
Equations for capacity sector 
 Left Side of Equation Right Side of Equation Units 
1 
 
Capacity under 
construction 
INTEG (+construction start-construction 
finishing, initial capacity under 
construction) 
INIT=initial capacity under construction 
Gigawatt 
2 
 
Construction finishing capacity under construction  / 
construction time 
Gigawatt 
/year 
3  Construction time 3 year 
4  Average life span 30 year 
5  Capacity depreciation functioning capacity /average life span Gigawatt 
/year 
6  Functioning capacity INTEG( construction finishing  - capacity 
depreciation , 45.551) 
INIT=45.551 
Gigawatt  
7  Gap of capacity desired capacity  - functioning capacity Gigawatt  
8  Time to estimate 
capacity depreciation 
1 year 
9  Estimated capacity 
depreciation 
SMOOTH N ( capacity depreciation ,  
time to estimate capacity 
depreciation ,capacity depreciation , 1) 
Gigawatt 
/year 
10  Capacity adjustment 
time 
1 year 
11  Construction start (gap of capacity + desired capacity * 
estimated growth rate of demand) / 
capacity adjustment time + estimated 
capacity depreciation 
Gigawatt 
/year 
12  Desired capacity Demand sector Gigawatt  
13  Estimated growth rate of 
demand 
Demand sector Dmnl 
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Construction time is an estimate. Usually it takes 2 to 3 years to build a small-capacity 
thermal generator, 4-5 years for a big-capacity thermal generator. For the time being, I will just 
define it as 3 years and will run sensitivity tests about this estimate in the model validation 
section. Time to estimate capacity depreciation and capacity adjustment time are my assumptions, 
according to the aim of NDRC, which is to make annual investment of capacity. Average life 
span is according to my field research (Zhou 2008) 
Now let us move on to the demand sector. 
2) Demand sector 
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Here functioning capacity is also included in the sector, just to make the equation of thermal 
generation realistic, as discussed before. See the equations for demand section in Table 5. 
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Table 5 Equations for Demand Sector 
Equations for demand sector 
 
Left Side of 
Equation 
Right Side of Equation Units 
1 
 
Desired capacity estimated electricity demand/benchmark 
hours 
Gigawatt 
2 
 
Estimated growth 
rate of demand 
(1+estimated growth rate of GDP) 
*(1+estimated growth rate of electricity 
intensity)-1 
Dmnl 
3 
 
Estimated growth 
rate of GDP 
SMOOTH N(growth rate of real GDP, time 
to estimate GDP growth rate , growth rate 
of real GDP , 1 ) 
Dmnl 
4  Estimated growth 
rate of electricity 
intensity 
SMOOTH N(growth rate of electricity 
intensity, time to estimate electricity 
intensity growth rate, growth rate of 
electricity intensity ,1 ) 
Dmnl 
5  Time to estimate 
electricity intensity 
growth rate 
1 year 
6  Time to estimate 
GDP growth rate 
1 year  
7  Total electricity 
demand 
electricity intensity/kilowatt to gigawatt 
convertor*real GDP*billion convertor 
Gigawatt 
*hour/year  
8  Thermal 
generation 
min(total electricity demand*percentage of 
thermal generation, functioning capacity* 
maximum working hours a year) 
Gigawatt 
*hour/year 
9  Perceived thermal 
generation 
INTEG (change in perception, thermal 
generation) 
INIT=thermal generation 
Gigawatt 
/year 
10  Perception time of 
demand 
0.25 year 
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11  Growth rate of real 
GDP 
(real GDP-real GDP last year)/real GDP 
last year 
Dmnl 
12  Growth rate of 
electricity intensity 
(electricity intensity-electricity intensity 
last year)/electricity intensity last year 
Dmnl 
13  Real GDP last year DELAY N(real GDP, 1, real GDP, 12 ) Billion 
*CNY/year 
14  Electricity 
intensity last year 
DELAY N(electricity intensity, 1 , 
electricity intensity, 12 ) 
Kilowatt 
*hour/CNY 
15  Real GDP Data file Billion 
*CNY/year 
16  Electricity 
intensity 
Data file Kilowatt 
*hour/CNY 
17  Percentage of 
thermal generation 
0.8 Dmnl 
18 
 
Change in 
perception 
(thermal generation-perceived thermal 
generation)/perception time of demand 
Gigawatt 
*hour/year 
/year 
19  Estimated 
electricity demand 
perceived thermal generation Gigawatt 
*hour/year 
20  Benchmark hours 5000 Hour/year 
21  Maximum woking 
hours a year 
8760 Hour/year 
22  Kilowatt to 
gigawatt convertor 
1e+006 Kilowatt 
/Gigawatt 
23  Billion convertor 1e+009 Dmnl 
/Billion 
 
All the parameters in Table 5 are all assumptions. But I do have confidence in the 
assumption about perception time of demand. I searched carefully about this perception time, and 
found we do have seasonal analysis reports of electricity industry. In these reports, decision 
makers always summarized what have happened in the electricity industry in the past season: 
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mainly the relationship between electricity demand and supply, electricity price etc, and made 
forecast about the relationship between electricity demand and supply for the rest of the year 
(DRCNET 2005; DRCNET 2007). Therefore, a quarter of a year might be a good assumption 
about perception time. Percentage of thermal generation is an approximation of what really is 
(between 0.79 to 0.82). Regarding benchmark hours, we discussed much about it in Section 3 and 
we will test it in model validation part.  
So far, we have finished model formulation and will run the model and do the tests in 
Section 5.  
5 Model validation and policy tests 
First, I will see whether the model can replicate the reference modes. Then I will run 
structure and behavior tests to see whether the behavior is consistent with my hypothesis, and 
therefore lends support to it.  After that, I will run extreme condition tests to make sure my model 
is robust even under extreme conditions. Then I will run parameter sensitivity test to make sure 
the model is not sensitive to the parameters I am not sure about, as well as to see to which 
parameters that can be controlled by my client the model is sensitive so as to  gain hint about 
policy suggestions. In addition to policy parameters, I will test the policy of adding a new 
structure to the model to see how it works. 
5.1 Reference Mode Replication Test 
In this part, I will show the behaviors of variables of interest, and compare them with their 
reference modes.  
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Figure 29 Reference Mode Replication Test: Gap of Capacity 
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Figure 30 Reference Mode Replication Test: Functioning Capacity 
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Figure 31 Reference Mode Replication Test: Average Working Hours 
 
As shown above, the model can roughly replicate the reference modes, especially the 
characteristic behaviors in the reference modes.  
5.2 Structure and Behavior Tests 
In this part, I will test my hypotheses about the dynamic problem. First, I will test whether 
counteracting feedback loop C3 is the reason for oscillation in the reference mode. Then I will 
test whether exponential growth in GDP is the reason for exponential growth in functioning 
capacity. I will leave the rest of tests to the parameter (policy parameter) sensitivity test part and 
policy test: ⑴ whether underestimates about electricity demand and capacity depreciation have 
been the reason for electricity shortage; ⑵ whether ignorance of construction time when deciding 
construction start causes capacity shortage; ⑶ whether fast growth in GDP and improper pricing 
mechanism adds to the shortage. Below I repeat the overall causal loop diagram. 
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I) Hypothesis about oscillation 
My hypothesis is that Loop C3 is the reason for oscillations in the reference modes (gap 
between desired capacity and average working hours). I will test this hypothesis by cutting loop 
C3 and compare the behavior of the model with the behavior before C3 is not cut. I will call the 
behavior of the model before C3 the business as usual run, when parameters and structures are 
those which replicate the reference mode. 
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Figure 32 Structure and Behavior Test: Oscillations in Gap of Capacity 
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Figure 33 Structure and Behavior Test: Oscillation in Average Working Hours 
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First, I will cut the loop of C3, by making adjustment time extremely big, say 1e+009, to see 
whether the oscillations in the reference modes will disappear. See Figure 34 and Figure 35 
below. 
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Figure 34 Structure and Behavior Test: Gap of Capacity, Cut Loop C3 and Business as Usual 
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Figure 35 Structure and Behavior Test: Average Working Hours, Cut Loop C3 and Business as Usual 
 
As shown in Figure 34 and Figure 35, both gap of capacity and average working hours 
showed no oscillations after cutting loop C3. Therefore, the behavior is consistent with my 
hypothesis, and therefore lends support to it. Since the absence of the loop eliminated the 
behavior, I can infer that the presence of the loop contributes to the behavior. 
As discussed in literature review, there is argument that cyclical behavior in the relationship 
between electricity supply and demand is driven by economic cycles. I will test it by making real 
GDP constant. Suppose real GDP equals to 1000 billion CNY per year all the time. See the 
behavior of gap of capacity and average working hours. 
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Figure 36 Structure and Behavior Test: Gap of Capacity, Oscillations Remain even when GDP is Constant 
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Figure 37 Structure and Behavior Test: Average Working Hours, Oscillations Remain even when GDP is 
Constant 
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As shown in Figure 36 and Figure 37, gap of capacity and average working hours still 
exhibit cyclical behavior even when GDP stays constant all the time. This indicates that cycles in 
the reference mode could arise endogenously, even without exogenous economic cycles. 
Therefore, there is the potential at least to reduce the cycles by managing the endogenous process, 
managing the stock of capacity under construction in this case, which will be discussed in the 
policy test part. 
II) Hypothesis about exponential growth 
My hypothesis is that exponential growth in functioning capacity, as well as amplifying 
amplitude in the cycles in the gap of capacity, is driven by exogenous GDP, which is 
exponentially growing. Assuming GDP is constant (cutting the exogenous positive feedback 
loop), see the behavior of functioning capacity in Figure 38. 
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Figure 38 Structure and Behavior Test: Functioning Capacity, No Exponential Growth when GDP is 
Constant 
 
As shown in Figure 38, functioning capacity does not show exponential growth in the GDP 
constant run at all. Instead, there is a decline in the functioning capacity, which is driven by the 
decline in electricity intensity, i.e. improvement in electricity efficiency, which brings decline to 
total electricity demand.  
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So far, we have finished structure and behavior tests. By cutting the loops hypothesized to 
be responsible for the characteristic behaviors in the reference mode, we can build even more 
confidence in my hypotheses in Section 4. Now let us move to extreme condition tests. 
5.3 Extreme Condition Tests 
I) Assume functioning capacity is 0 all the time, by setting initial functioning capacity = 0, 
initial capacity under construction =0 and total demand =0. See thermal generation in Figure 
39.  
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Figure 39 Extreme Condition Test: Thermal Generation when Functioning Capacity=0 
 
As shown in Figure 39, when functioning capacity equals to 0 all the time, there is no 
thermal generation at all. In the real world, when there is no capacity, there is supposed to be no 
electricity generation as well. Therefore, the model behaves in a realistic way under this extreme 
condition test.  
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II) Suppose it takes 1 trillion years to construct capacity, see functioning capacity and thermal 
generation. 
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Figure 40 Extreme Condition Test: Functioning Capacity when Construction Time=1+009 
 
As shown in Figure 40, functioning capacity exhibits an exponential decay, because there 
would be almost no new capacity added to this stock, while 3.3% of capacity depreciates every 
year. In the real world, when there is a 3.3% annual rate of decline, the capacity should be cut in 
half in about 21 years, according to the “rule of 70”. This is consistent with what is shown in 
Figure 40 (around the year 2001, the capacity is cut half as the initial value.). 
See thermal generation in Figure 41. Thermal generation first increases as demand increases, 
but afterwards, when functioning capacity is no longer sufficient to satisfy demand, thermal 
generation decays as functioning capacity does, which is realistic. 
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Figure 41 Extreme Condition Test: Thermal Generation when Construction Time=1+009 
 
III) Suppose total electricity demand =0 all the time, see functioning capacity, construction start, 
capacity under construction, construction finish and thermal generation. 
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Figure 42 Extreme Condition Test: Functioning Capacity when Total Electricity Demand=0 
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As shown in Figure 42, when total demand equals to 0, functioning capacity first increases 
because there is still some capacity in the pipeline. But afterwards functioning capacity starts to 
decline because of the 3.3% of capacity depreciation. This is consistent with what is expected in 
the real world. 
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Figure 43 Extreme Condition Test: Construction Start when Total Electricity Demand=0 
 
In reality, if there is no demand, there will be no need to start construction (construction start 
equals to 0), as shown in Figure 43. 
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Figure 44 Extreme Condition Test: Capacity under Construction when Total Electricity Demand=0 
 
In the real world, when there is no demand, then construction start equals to 0 all the time, 
the capacity initially in the pipeline will be sent to the functioning capacity gradually (deducted 
from capacity under construction). The more the capacity under construction is, the more 
capacity will be sent every year. When capacity under construction approaches 0, the capacity 
that will be sent to functioning capacity will also approach 0. In any case, capacity under 
construction will never go negative. As shown in Figure 44, the stock of capacity under 
construction exhibits an exponential decay until 0, which is as expected in the real world. 
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Figure 45 Extreme Condition Test: Construction Finishing when Total Electricity Demand=0 
 
Construction finishing is proportional to capacity under construction. It will decay as 
capacity under construction but will never go negative. The graph shown in Figure 45 is just as 
expected in the real world. 
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Figure 46 Extreme Condition Test: Thermal Generation when Total Electricity Demand=0 
 
When there is no demand, there would be no electricity generation, regardless of the 
capacity available. The graph shown in Figure 46 is consistent with what is expected in the real 
world.  
Until now, according to my knowledge, extreme tests are ok and the model is robust under 
extreme conditions. Now let us move to parameter sensitivity test. 
5.4 Parameter Sensitivity Test 
As mentioned in the model formulation part, there are some parameters that I am not sure 
about, or make estimates of. There are also some variables that are in the hand of NDRC (policy 
parameters) and I would like to see whether the model is sensitive to them so that I could give 
some strategic hint about policy suggestions.  Table 6 lists all the parameters and differentiates 
them.  
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Table 6 List of Parameters to Run Sensitivity Tests On 
parameters 
have confidence Not sure about or 
make estimate of  
Policy parameters 
Capacity adjustment time 
 √ √ 
time to estimate capacity 
depreciation 
 √ √ 
perception time of demand √  √ 
construction time 
 √  
time to estimate GDP growth rate 
 √ √ 
time to estimate electricity 
intensity growth rate 
 √ √ 
benchmark hours 
 √ √ 
 
First I run the sensitivity tests on all the parameters that I am not sure about or make 
estimate of, just to build further confidence in the model. It turns out that the model is not 
sensitive to any of them except capacity adjustment time. Table 7 lists the sensitivity results of all 
the parameters that the model is not sensitive to (I test the behaviors of all the 3 variables of 
interest: gap of capacity, functioning capacity and average working hours and the conclusion is 
the same. Here I choose gap of capacity only as the responsive variable.). I will discuss the 
sensitivity test of adjustment time later.  
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Table 7 List of Sensitivity Results of All the Parameters That the Model is not Sensitive To 
parameters 
Range of 
change 
Percentage change Responsive change 
(on average) 
time to estimate capacity 
depreciation 
0.083~1 91.7% 1.16% 
construction time 2~5 100% 12.7% 
time to estimate GDP 
growth rate 
0.083~1 91.7% 7.37% 
time to estimate electricity 
intensity growth rate 
0.083~1 91.7% 5.04% 
benchmark hours 4800~5500 14% 3.51% 
Note: percentage change is calculated by dividing the absolute change of parameters’ change range by the 
value of the parameters assumed in the model. Average responsive change is calculated by dividing the 
absolute change of gap of capacity under upper and lower bound of parameters by the absolute length of scale 
of business as usual run. 
 
Now let us look at the sensitivity test of capacity adjustment time and I will show the 
behavior of functioning capacity and gap of capacity. As shown in Figure 47, functioning 
capacity is numerically sensitive to capacity adjustment time. The upper bound of sensitivity runs 
is when capacity adjustment time =0.5 year. When capacity adjustment time=0.5, functioning 
capacity in model run is close to its reference mode before 1999 but starts to go beyond reference 
mode by the end of the time scale under study. And the cyclical behavior in functioning capacity 
is much more obvious than in the reference mode, due to the aggressive adjustment. In this sense, 
0.5 year is not a good assumption about capacity adjustment time. The lower bound of sensitivity 
runs is when capacity adjustment time=2 years. When capacity adjustment time=2, functioning 
capacity in model run is much lower than its reference mode. As discussed in the model 
formulation section, NDRC makes annual investment and balances electricity generation and 
electricity capacity on a yearly basis, 1 year could be a good assumption about capacity 
adjustment time.  
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Figure 47 Parameter Sensitivity Test: Functioning Capacity, Capacity Adjustment Time=0.5~2 
 
The same conclusion can be derived from the behavior of gap of capacity, as shown in 
Figure 48. 
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Figure 48 Parameter Sensitivity Test: Gap of Capacity, Capacity Adjustment Time=0.5~2 
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Most of variables that I am not sure about or make estimates of do not have big effect on the 
model. The model is sensitive only to capacity adjustment time but it is found in Figure 47 and 
Figure 48 that my assumption about capacity adjustment time before was realistic.  
Now let us move to the sensitivity tests of policy parameters, most of which have been done 
above, except perception time of demand. I did the sensitivity test of this policy parameter and 
found that the model was not sensitive to it, although a smaller perception time of demand did 
improve the behavior of the model. Therefore, underestimates of demand due to the current 
perception time of demand could be a cause for capacity shortage. However, changing perception 
time of demand is not an effective policy suggestion. 
Regarding other policy parameters, the model is not sensitive to 4 of them, as shown in 
Table 6: time to estimate GDP growth rate, time to estimate electricity intensity growth rate, time 
to estimate capacity depreciation, and benchmark hours. I also run the sensitivity test about the 
first 3 time parameters together, which have something to do with underestimates of total demand 
and underestimates of capacity depreciation. Still the model is not sensitive to them together. 
Indeed, reducing these 3 parameters reduces underestimates and reduces gap of capacity, which 
indicates that underestimates of total demand and underestimates of capacity depreciation could 
be part of the reasons for capacity shortage. However, the fact that the model is not sensitive to 
them indicates that they are not effective policy parameters, at least under the current decision 
rules.  
As discussed above, the model is sensitive to capacity adjustment time, which is also a 
policy parameter. From Figure 47 and Figure 48 we know that if policy makers decide to close 
the gap between functioning capacity and desired capacity in 0.5 year, then the gap will oscillate 
around 0, which means capacity shortage can be removed. However, aggressive adjustment 
causes more oscillations in the system. On the other hand, since the NDRC’s mission of 
electricity industry is to balance annual electricity demand and supply, the suggestion of more 
aggressive adjustment is not feasible. Therefore, let us stick to the 1-year capacity adjustment 
time.  
Let us summarize the discussion about policy parameters above in this: under current 
decision rules, there are no effective policy suggestions about all the parameters, except capacity 
adjustment time. However, a smaller capacity adjustment time is not feasible for NDRC. It seems 
the model has reached its bottleneck under current decision rules, which might call for a change 
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in the decision rules. We have talked much about ignorance of construction time when deciding 
construction start before and said we would leave it to policy test part. Now let us move to 
structural policy test. 
5.5 Policy Test 
In this part, I will add a new structure to the model, which takes construction time into 
consideration when deciding construction start. As discussed in Section 4, ignorance of 
construction time when deciding construction start results in not big enough the stock of capacity 
under construction, which makes it impossible for functioning capacity to keep up with desired 
capacity, in the presence of 3 years’ construction time. Therefore, what we can do is manage 
capacity under construction by taking construction time into consideration. Let us make the goal 
of capacity under construction a function of construction time and adjust capacity under 
construction to the goal, which adds to construction start. 
Usually, managing capacity under construction aims to make the flows flowing the system 
are all equal, so the goal of capacity under construction is the estimated capacity depreciation 
times construction time (Sterman 2000). However, in this case, functioning capacity is increasing 
all the time, so the goal of capacity under construction (desired capacity under construction) 
should take into consideration the growth in functioning capacity in addition to estimated 
capacity depreciation in order to ensure exponential growth in functioning capacity. 
Let us make the equation of desired capacity under construction as follows: 
Desired capacity under construction= (estimated capacity depreciation + desired 
capacity*estimated growth rate of demand/capacity adjustment time) * construction time   
Unit consistency:  
Gigawatt = (Gigawatt/year + Gigawatt * dimensionless / year) * year = Gigawatt 
When deciding the part of construction start as a result of managing capacity under 
construction, it is also necessary to add to the growth rate of electricity demand, because desired 
capacity under construction is also growing exponentially. 
Time to adjust capacity under construction should be 1 year, in order to make capacity under 
construction catch up with its increasing goal every year so that it can always send enough new 
capacity as desired to functioning capacity,. 
See the modified model structure in Figure 49. 
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Figure 49 Policy: Adding the Management of Capacity under Construction 
 
Now let us look at the behavior of gap of capacity, functioning capacity and average 
working hours, Figure 50, Figure 51 and Figure 52. 
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Figure 50 Policy Test: Gap of Capacity, With and Without Adding Management of Capacity under 
Construction  
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Figure 51 Policy Test: Functioning Capacity, With and Without Adding Management of Capacity under 
Construction  
average working hours: with and without managing capacity under construction
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Figure 52 Policy Test: Average Working Hours, With and Without Adding Management of Capacity under 
Construction  
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As shown in Figure 50, Figure 51 and Figure 52, there is big improvement in the behavior of 
the model after adding the structure of managing capacity under construction. On one hand, 
taking into consideration the construction time when deciding desired capacity under construction 
greatly reduced the gap of capacity and average working hours. On the other hand, management 
of capacity under construction also reduces the oscillations in the gap of capacity and average 
working hours, which will be shown again later when running sensitivity test about GDP growth 
rate. 
Regarding the feasibility of this policy, I am optimistic. Indeed, managing the stock of 
capacity under construction is completely new to NDRC. However, just because it is new, it 
might be easier for NDRC to adopt it than changing their old habit of merely closing the gap of 
existing capacity. 
After introducing this policy of managing capacity under construction, I would like to run 
the sensitivity tests of the 5 policy parameters again because there might be more policy options 
after making the structural change. My finding is that after managing capacity under construction, 
the model is more sensitive to these two time parameters: time to estimate GDP growth rate 
(0.25~1 year) and time to estimate electricity intensity growth rate (0.25~1 year). Figure 53 
shows the sensitivity test result of the two parameters together, after adding the management of 
capacity under construction. The model is numerically sensitive to these two parameters. In 
reality, it is also feasible to update the estimates of GDP growth rate and electricity intensity 
growth rate on a quarterly basis, just as updating estimates of demand. Therefore, it is 
recommended that NDRC update the estimates of GDP growth rate and electricity intensity 
growth rate more often, say on a quarterly basis.  
Figure 54, Figure 55 and Figure 56 shows the result of updating the estimates of GDP 
growth rate and electricity intensity growth rate on a quarterly basis in addition to the policy of 
adding management of capacity under construction, compared to adding management of capacity 
under construction alone and business as usual run. Updating the estimates about growth rate on a 
quarterly basis in addition to managing capacity under construction turns out to be an effective 
policy, in terms of both reducing the oscillations in the reference modes and reducing gap of 
capacity and average working hours of thermal generators. 
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Figure 53 Policy Sensitivity Tests of Two Policy Parameters together: Time to Estimate GDP Growth Rate 
and Time to Estimate Electricity Intensity Growth Rate, after Adding Management of Capacity under 
Construction  
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Figure 54 Policy Test: Gap of Capacity, Adding Management of CUC with Time to Estimate GDP Growth 
Rate and Time to Estimate Electricity Intensity Growth Rate both equal to 0.25 year, Adding Management 
of CUC and Business As Usual 
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Figure 55 Policy Test: Functioning Capacity, Adding Management of CUC with Time to Estimate GDP 
Growth Rate and Time to Estimate Electricity Intensity Growth Rate both equal to 0.25 year, Adding 
Management of CUC and Business As Usual 
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Figure 56 Policy Test: Average Working Hours, Adding Management of CUC with Time to Estimate GDP 
Growth Rate and Time to Estimate Electricity Intensity Growth Rate both equal to 0.25 year, Adding 
Management of CUC and Business As Usual 
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Now I will run policy robustness test to see whether the combination of policy options is 
robust subject to (bad) changes in the parameters that are out of NDRC’s hand. There are 2 
variables that are not controlled by policy makers: construction time and GDP growth rate. Let us 
run policy test when construction time ranges from 3 to 5 years on average (becomes longer). 
Look at the tests in Figure 57. 
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Figure 57 Policy Robustness Test: Combination of Adding Management of CUC and Updating the 
Estimates of GDP Growth Rate and Electricity Intensity Growth Rate on a Quarterly Basis, when 
Construction Time ranges from 3 to 5 years 
 
As shown in Figure 57, when the combination of the 2 policy options is adopted, gap of 
capacity is not sensitive to construction time. This is mainly due to the fact that we take into 
consideration of construction time when deciding construction start by managing capacity under 
construction. I also run the policy robustness test of adding managing capacity under construction 
alone and the model is also not sensitive to construction time. Now let us change the growth rate 
of GDP to see whether the combination of policy options is also robust to fast GDP growth rate.  
Let us assume the fractional GDP growth rate ranges from 3% to 15% after 2005, while 
electricity intensity is assumed to stay unchanged after 2005 so that growth rate of GDP is 
equivalent to growth rate of demand. We extend the time scale under study to 2030. (After 2005, 
GDP fractional growth rate is a constant and electricity intensity also stays unchanged, so time to 
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estimate the growth rate of GDP and growth rate of electricity intensity does not have effect on 
model behaviors). Before the policy sensitivity test, let us compare the 2 model runs: cuc and no 
cuc (cuc means managing capacity under construction), assuming GDP fractional growth rate 
=10% (years before 2005, there is no management of capacity under construction as in history.). 
See the behaviors of gap of capacity and average working hours in Figure 58 and Figure 59. 
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Figure 58 Policy Test: Gap of Capacity, Managing Capacity Under Construction and No Managing, when 
GDP Fractional Growth Rate=10% 
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Figure 59 Policy Test: Average Working Hours, Managing Capacity under Construction and No Managing, 
when GDP Fractional Growth Rate=10% 
 
  
As shown in Figure 58 and Figure 59, the behavior of gap of capacity and average working 
hours greatly improved after managing the stock of capacity under construction: both gap of 
capacity and average working hours greatly reduced and the oscillations in them were removed.  
Now let us run the sensitivity test about GDP fractional growth rate ranging from 3% to 
15%, when the policy of managing capacity under construction is carried out. 
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Figure 60 Policy Robustness Test: Managing Capacity under Construction, GDP Fractional Growth Rate 
3%~15% 
 
As shown in Figure 60, the policy of managing capacity under construction is not robust 
when GDP fractional growth rate is too high. However, this is not caused by the principle of 
managing capacity under construction itself. Instead, it is caused by the goal of capacity under 
construction we set in this case. When GDP fractional growth rate is too high, underestimates 
about desired capacity and capacity depreciation also increase rapidly. And estimate about 
capacity depreciation is a part of desired capacity under construction (the goal of capacity under 
construction) because only estimated capacity depreciation is available to decision makers, rather 
than the real-time capacity depreciation. Let us test this hypothesis by setting time to estimate 
capacity depreciation =0.25 year (0.25 year is the minimum realistic time for time to estimate 
capacity depreciation. Because in reality, it does not make any difference if NDRC update their 
estimates of capacity depreciation more often than they do to their estimates of total demand.). 
Then run the policy sensitivity test again. See Figure 61. 
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Figure 61 Policy Robustness Test: Managing Capacity under Construction while Time to Estimate 
Capacity Depreciation= 0.25, GDP Fractional Growth Rate 3%~15% 
 
As shown in Figure 61, after setting time to estimate = 0.25 year (a quarter), gap of capacity 
is still sensitive to GDP growth rate, but much less. And the upper bound (GDP fractional growth 
rate = 15%) of the sensitivity run is only about a third of that in Figure 60 and is close to the run 
when time to estimate capacity depreciation is 1 year and GDP fractional growth rate is 10%. 
This indicates that updating the estimates about depreciated capacity more often, say on a 
quarterly basis could be a effective policy option. 
 In reality, it will increase much work for the decision makers to update their estimates about 
capacity depreciation every quarter, rather than every year. However, it is not as difficult as 
reducing the capacity adjustment time because reducing capacity adjustment time means 
investing more every time, which needs more effort and actually systematic effort. Updating 
estimates more often, however, only requires more effort on data collecting and data examining. 
Therefore, to update estimates about capacity depreciation more often is a comparatively feasible 
policy option. (I also tried changing perception time of demand but it does not change the model 
behavior much.)  
However, the policy of updating estimates about capacity depreciation has to work together 
with the policy of managing capacity under construction. See Figure 62, without managing 
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capacity under construction, time to estimate capacity depreciation hardly helps reduce capacity 
shortage. 
no cuc fgr=10% 
cuc fgr=10% 
50% 75% 95% 100%
gap of capacity
200
147.5
95
42.5
-10
1980 1993 2005 2018 2030
Time (Year)
 
Figure 62 Policy Sensitivity Test: With and Without Managing Capacity under Construction when GDP 
Fractional Growth Rate =10%, Time to Estimate Capacity Depreciation = 0.25~1 
 
Any way, as shown in Figure 61, it is impossible to eliminate capacity shortage when the 
underestimates of desired capacity and capacity deprecation is inevitable. And the capacity 
shortage is very sensitive to GDP fractional growth rate (demand growth rate), especially when 
GDP growth rate exceeds 10% per year, capacity shortage increases rapidly.  
In the Outline of the 11th Five-Year Plan by the CPC Central Committee (2005), it is 
expected that China’s GDP grows 7.5% annually. However, the GDP in 2006 is 10.24% bigger 
than that in 2005, which surpassed the expectation of 11th five-year plan. We do not know for the 
time being what the growth rate in the following 4 years will also surpass 7.5%, but in any case, 
we have to reduce electricity intensity in order to offset the fast growth rate of GDP, so as to 
constrain electricity demand growth from growing too fast. 
By studying the electricity intensity in the past 25 years, it is found that there is a trend of 
decline in electricity intensity, i.e. improvement in electricity efficiency, even without effect from 
price, administrative measures and so on. See Figure 63 and Figure 64 below.  
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Figure 63 Electricity Intensity in China from 1980 to 2005 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration, United States 
             World Net Conventional Thermal Electricity Generation, Most Recent Annual Estimates, 1980-
2006  
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/electricitygeneration.html 
National Bureau of Statistics of China (2007)              
Gross Domestic Product 
                      http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2007/indexch.htm  
                     Global Econ Data 
China, GDP deflator, 1980~2006 
                      http://www.econstats.com/weo/C035V021.htm  
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Figure 64 Growth Rate of Electricity Intensity in China from 1980 to 2005 
In the past decades, electricity price in China has been very stable. However, we can see an 
average growth rate of -3% in electricity intensity, with only a few exceptions. However, 
electricity intensity has been increasing since 2001, although the growth rate of electricity 
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intensity is on its decline. This calls for an effective pricing mechanism even more so as to lower 
electricity intensity. 
In the paper named Testimony on The Effect of Restructuring on Price Elasticities of 
Demand and Supply, Stevens and Lerner (1996) summarized several studies of price elasticity in 
regulated electricity market in California. They found that short-run elasticity of residential, 
commercial and industrial demand is respectively -0.06 to -0.49, -0.17 to -0.25, -0.04 to -0.22 and 
long-run elasticity is respectively -0.45 to -1.89, -1.00 to -1.60 and  -0.51 to -1.82.  
In China, industrial consumption of electricity accounts for more than 70% of the total 
consumption, therefore, we can refer to short-run elasticity of industrial demand in California as a 
point of start, which is -0.04 to -0.22. (Why short-run rather than long-run is because I am going 
to analyze the yearly growth rate in electricity intensity and a year is a short term.) However, the 
electricity intensity in China has been much bigger than in the US. (The electricity intensity in 
2005 in China is 0.269 Kilowatt/CNY, according to Figure 63, while electricity intensity in 1997 
in the US is 0.402 Kilowatt/Dollar, according to EIA. The exchange rate between Dollars to CNY 
is around 8.) Therefore, the electricity intensity in China is almost 5 times as big as that in the US. 
In this sense, it is reasonable to assume the price elasticity in China is bigger than that in the US, 
because there is much more room for electricity efficiency to improve. Suppose the price 
elasticity in China is 2 times that in the US, which is -0.08 to -0.44 approximately.  
1) Scenario I: price elasticity is -0.08 
In this case, electricity intensity is very insensitive to electricity price. Suppose electricity 
price grows at 4% a year, then electricity intensity only declines at 0.32% per year, which hardly 
has any effect on electricity intensity. In this sense, pricing mechanism can not really help to 
reduce the growth rate of electricity demand, much less balance functioning capacity with desired 
capacity. 
2) Scenario II: price elasticity is -0.44 
In this case, electricity intensity is sensitive to electricity price. Suppose electricity price 
grows at 4% (around 0.024 CNY/Kilowatt) a year, then electricity intensity declines at 1.76% per 
year, which can offset almost 2% growth in China’s GDP. As shown in Figure 61, when GDP 
growth rate is below 10% (GDP growth rate is equal to demand growth rate by then), gap of 
capacity is stable and comparatively small. Given the 10.24% GDP growth rate in 2006 and 
expected 7.5% annual growth rate in the 11th five year plan, proper pricing mechanism does help 
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to balance functioning capacity with desired capacity by making the growth rate of electricity 
demand less than 10%. Because China has been in electricity shortage for long, in which case 
price is supposed to rise if it is market determined. However, due to the improper pricing 
mechanism so far in China, the government takes a dominating role in determining electricity 
price, which makes electricity price fail to represent the relationship between electricity demand 
and supply and thus not increase as it should have.  
6 Contributions and Limitations of this Study 
6.1 Major findings 
Managing the stock of capacity under construction can not only reduce or eliminate the 
oscillations in these two variables, but also greatly reduce capacity shortage. Without the policy 
of managing capacity under construction, no feasible policy is available to effectively reduce 
oscillations and capacity shortage. Managing the stock of capacity under construction is an 
indispensable solution to the dynamic problem addressed in the paper. In the meanwhile, the 
policy of managing the stock of capacity under construction is robust even if construction time 
becomes longer, say up to 5 years. However, this policy can not stop big capacity shortage from 
happening when GDP grows too fast and pricing mechanism is not working properly so as to 
reduce electricity intensity, i.e. improve electricity efficiency. 
Other policy options to reduce capacity shortage could be eliminating the underestimates of 
electricity demand and capacity depreciation, introducing more market effect into electricity 
pricing and lowering the growth rate of GDP. Eliminating the underestimates turns out to be 
effective in terms of reducing capacity shortage after adopting the policy of managing capacity 
under construction. Therefore, it is recommended that NDRC update their estimates of GDP 
growth rate, electricity intensity growth rate and capacity depreciation more often, say on a 
quarterly basis. And of course, they also need to act on those updated estimates. Whether price is 
effective in affecting electricity intensity in China still needs more research. If the price elasticity 
is big enough, then improving the improper pricing mechanism now in China by introducing 
more market effect into pricing could be an effective solution as to reduce electricity intensity, 
thus offsetting the fast growth rate in GDP and reducing capacity shortage. China also needs to 
think about lowering the growth rate of GDP, called soft landing. Otherwise, the government 
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needs to take measures in addition to pricing, such as administrative, financial and tax measures 
to reduce electricity intensity, so as to offset the effect of fast growing GDP and reduce capacity 
shortage.  
6.2 Limitations and further research 
First of all, the boundary of the research does not include other important elements in 
electricity industry, such as coal and grid. In my further research, I would like to include coal into 
the boundary. Because coal is also the main primary source of energy for electricity, so 
decreasing coal reserves could become a barrier for capacity growth. Plus, coal reserves 
determines coal price, which is the main cost for unit electricity produced, thus it is very 
important in determining electricity price.  
Second, in the paper, electricity price is taken as exogenous because it is not affected by the 
feedback from the model in the time period under study. However, looking into the future, it is 
necessary to model electricity price as endogenous variable, which will be affected by the 
relationship between electricity demand and supply. I would like to do that in my further research. 
At the same time, I will model the structure from electricity price to capacity investment and 
structure from electricity price to electricity intensity.  
Finally, the relationship between real-time electricity demand (load) and functioning 
capacity is not studied in the paper. In reality, we have to shift some load from peak hours to 
valley hours, in order to meet the load from consumers all the time. Electricity price proves to be 
a very effective measure in terms of load shifting according to relating literature, and there have 
been many researchers addressing different price mechanisms so as to shift real-time load from 
electricity consumers. For example, peak-valley electricity price has been used in industry-use 
electricity as a way of shifting load since late 1990s and is on trial for life-use electricity recently. 
Two parts electricity pricing mechanism came into use in 2005 and still needs much more 
research into it. I would like to extend the boundary of my research so as to study this aspect of 
electricity demand and pricing policy as well. 
6.3 Final word 
This University of Bergen master thesis provides a basic understanding of electricity 
shortage in China in the past few decades. It will be a point of departure for my second master 
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thesis at Fudan University, China and a foundation for my further study into the electricity 
industry in China. What I will do in the next phase is examine electricity price and see how it 
interacts with electricity supply and demand. The objective of next phase will remain the same: to 
identify policies for reducing shortage of electricity in China.  
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 I 
Appendix A    Terminology 
Electricity is a secondary form of energy, converted from variety of primary energy sources, 
such as fossil fuels, hydro, uranium, wind, solar, tidal and so on.  
According to these different primary energy sources, electricity plants are classified into 
thermal plant, hydro power plant, nuclear power plant. All conventional, large-scale electricity 
production uses the same fundamental technology in which a turbine, propelled by steam, water 
or gas, is used to drive a generator (Figure A. a). For smaller scale facilities, internal combustion 
engines or wind-driven blades may be coupled directly to a generator. Figure A. b gave a 
depiction of electricity supply chains, including thermal power, hydro power and alternative 
electric supply systems based upon wind and solar.  
 
 Figure A  Functional Components of the Electricity Industry: (a) Central Electric Station Configuration, (b) 
Electricity Supply Chains 
Source: Geography of supply, Figure 4.7  
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Generator converts one form of energy into the energy of electricity at a certain rate (joules 
per second, calories per day, or barrels of oil equivalent per year). This rate is the power of 
generator, single dynamo capacity. Watt is the international system of unit (SI) for power.  
1 Watt = 
Second 1
Joule 1
                                                                                                                 ⑴ 
Or, 1 Joule = 1 Watt-Second                                                                                                  ⑵ 
After a certain period of time, generators produces a certain amount of electricity, which is 
power (Watt) * time (Second), the unit of which is Joule. The same applies to electricity 
consumption. Electricity end-users consume electricity also at a certain rate, in form of bulbs, 
televisions, and fans and so on. The unit of consumption capacity is also Watt. After running for 
a certain time period, electrical equipment consumes a certain amount of electricity, which is 
measured in Joule.  
Some units that are derived from Watt are also used in practice, such as Gigawatt, which is 1 
billion Watt, equal to 910 Watt, and Terawatt, which is 1 trillion Watt, equal to 1210  Watt. In 
reality, hour is used more often to measure how long generators or electrical equipment have 
been running, rather than second. Accordingly, Gigawatt hour and Terawatt hour are often used 
as the unit of the amount of electricity produced by generators. For example, a generator of 1 
Gigawatt capacity running for 1 hour generates 1 Gigawatt hour of electricity, while a bulb of 60 
Watt capacity lighting for 1 hour consumes 60 Watt hour of electricity. In the following, the 
paper uses Gigawatt as the unit of electricity production rate (generating capacity) and 
consumption rate (consuming capacity), Gigawatt hour as the unit of generated electricity 
(electricity generation) and consumed electricity (electricity consumption). 
Electricity must be used the instant it is produced. There is a connection from generator to 
end-users, called grid. Only the electricity generated by those generators that are connected to the 
grid can be consumed by electrical equipment at the end-users. The whole system from electricity 
production to consumption can be simplified as two machines connected by wire; one produces 
electricity, while the other consumes. Therefore, electricity production equals electricity 
consumption all the time. The power (capacity) of electrical equipment in use by end-users is 
regarded as instant electricity demand, or load from the customers, the unit of which is Gigawatt. 
Within a day, instant demand from end-users exists throughout and usually changes from time to 
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time, and is difficult to meet at any instant. Electricity demand is always bigger and reaches its 
peak during office hours in a day, which is called peak load.  
However, decisions about power plant construction are not made based on the electricity 
demand in every second. Instead, annual total electricity demand, which is the aggregated 
demand over a year, is usually taken as the basis to make a decision, the unit of which is 
Gigawatt hour. However, in reality, data about annual total electricity demand is usually 
unavailable. What is available is annual total electricity consumption, which is the satisfied 
annual total electricity demand, the unit of which is also Gigawatt hour. Every year, there is a 
projected annual total electricity demand, but how to make the projection is undisclosed to the 
public. That is also why there have been so many methods used to project annual total electricity 
demand, such as Grey System Theory, Time Series Model and Econometrics. 
Installed generating capacity, is sum of the capacity of all the generators ready to run, the 
unit of which is Gigawatt. When there is electricity shortage, it can be either a power (capacity) 
shortage or electricity generation shortage. The former is the shortage of installed generating 
capacity (Gigawatt), which is the focus of this paper, while the latter is the shortage of generated 
electricity (Gigawatt hour).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 IV 
Appendix B    System dynamics  
System dynamics is a feedback theory about policy making. Feedback is one of the core 
concepts of system dynamics. Stocks and flows, along with feedback, are the two central 
concepts of dynamics systems theory. 
Stocks are accumulations. They characterize the state of the system and generate the 
information upon which decisions and actions are based. Stocks give systems inertia and provide 
them with memory. Stocks create delays by accumulating the difference between the inflow to a 
process and its outflow. By decoupling rates of flow, stocks are the source of disequilibrium 
dynamics in system.  
In a system dynamics point of view, the behavior of a system arises from its structure. That 
structure consists of feedback loops, stocks and flows, and nonlinearities created by the 
interaction of the physical and institutional structure of the system with the decision-making 
processes of the agents acting within it. The basic modes of behavior in dynamic systems are 
identified along with the feedback structures generating them. These modes include growth, 
created by positive feedback; goal seeking, created by negative feedback; and oscillations 
(including damped oscillations, limit cycles, and chaos), and created by negative feedback with 
time delays.  
Oscillation is the third fundamental mode of behavior observed in dynamic systems. Like 
goal-seeking behavior, oscillations are caused by negative feedback loops. The state of the 
system is compared to its goal, and corrective actions are taken to eliminate any discrepancies. In 
an oscillatory system, the state of the system constantly overshoots its goal or equilibrium state, 
reserves, then undershoots, and so on. The overshooting arises from the presence of significant 
time delays in the negative loops. The time delays cause corrective actions to continue even after 
the state of the system reaches its goal, forcing the system to adjust too much, and triggering a 
new correction in the opposite direction.  
Oscillations can arise if there is a significant delay in any part of the negative loop. There 
may be delays in any of the information links making up the loop. There may be delays in 
perceiving the state of the system caused by the measurement and reporting system. There may 
be delays in initiating corrective actions after the discrepancy is perceived due to the time 
required to reach a decision. And there may be delays between the initiation of a corrective action 
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and its effect on the state of the system. It takes time for a company to measure and report 
inventory levels, time for management to meet and decide how much to produce, and more time 
while raw materials procurement, the labor force, and other needed resources respond to the new 
production schedule. Sufficiently long delays at any one of these points could cause inventory to 
oscillate. 
 
 
